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Comment
APPARENTLY, THERE ARE PLACES LIKE HOME: A PATH TO
PROPRIETY FOR CONSENT-BY-REGISTRATION
JURISDICTION IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRETT E. BROCZKOWSKI*
“The history of American freedom is, in no small measure,
the history of procedure.”1
I. THE WICKED WITCH OF THE WEST: THE TORNADIC BEGINNINGS
CONSENT-BY-REGISTRATION

OF

Forget continuous or systematic contacts; your six-employee Pennsylvania outpost that grosses a sneeze-worthy $20,000 a year just signed
your corporation up for general jurisdiction in the state.2 Sure, Daimler
AG v. Bauman3 stands for the proposition that a corporation can be sued
in the state of incorporation and the state that hosts its principal place of
business.4 But what about where your corporation is merely registered to
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.S. 2017, Saint Joseph’s University. This Comment is dedicated to my parents,
Edward and Gail Broczkowski, my sister, Brooke Broczkowski, and my girlfriend,
Rachel Pardoe for their endless support of my education and aspirations. I’d like
to thank all of the members of the Villanova Law Review for their help and support
throughout the entire writing and editing process, with a special thanks to Emily
Bley for creating the theme for this Comment.
1. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
2. See, e.g., Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 6, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Electrolux
Home Prods. Inc., No. 5:18-cv-00699, 2018 WL 3707377, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3,
2018) (stating its global workforce is 56,000, “only [six] of whom are located in
Pennsylvania”). Electrolux only maintained six employees in the state, but was
found amenable to personal jurisdiction in the state pursuant to Pennsylvania’s
consent-by-registration law. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prods. Inc.,
No. 5:18-cv-00699, 2018 WL 3707377, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2018) (finding the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant proper on the basis of consent-byregistration).
3. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
4. See id. at 137 (holding exercise of general jurisdiction under contacts theory requires continuous and systematic contacts). While the Court enumerated
the state of incorporation and principal place of business as the hallmark locales of
corporate general jurisdiction, it made clear that general jurisdiction may be
proper in others. See id. (noting the Court has not previously held that a corporation can be subject to general jurisdiction in only its state of incorporation and
principle place of business).

(101)
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do business?5 This is not a law class hypothetical; it is a reality.6 The three
continental states within the Third Circuit all confer general jurisdiction
over those corporations that register to do business within the respective
state.7 Pennsylvania boasts a statutory provision that explicitly purports to
confer general jurisdiction over business registrants.8 New Jersey and Delaware, despite lacking any explicit statutory provision, interpret their respective business registration statutes to serve as an entity’s consent to
general jurisdiction in each state.9 Although consent is a long-recognized
manner of obtaining personal jurisdiction, the Third Circuit district
courts have concerns when it comes to equating business representation with such consent.10 The United States Supreme Court’s
5. See, e.g., 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301(a) (West 2018) (stating
a corporation’s registration to do business in Pennsylvania constitutes consent to
general jurisdiction in state).
6. See id. (“The existence of any of the following relationships between a person and this Commonwealth shall . . . enable the tribunals of this Commonwealth
to exercise general personal jurisdiction over such person . . . .”). The provision in
subsection (a)(2)(i) provides that “qualification as a foreign corporation under
the laws of this Commonwealth” is one of the relationships that allows the Commonwealth to exercise general jurisdiction over the corporation. See id.
§ 5301(a)(2)(i) (stating registration is one of the relationships that constitutes
consent to general jurisdiction).
7. Compare § 5301(a) (stating registration is a basis for general jurisdiction
over corporations), with Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 470
(D.N.J. 2015) (interpreting New Jersey’s business registration statutes to confer
general jurisdiction over registrants), and Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1116
(Del. 1988) (interpreting Delaware’s business registration statutes to confer general jurisdiction over registrants). For a discussion of the interpretation of New
Jersey and Delaware statutes to confer jurisdiction, see infra notes 44–52 and accompanying text.
8. See § 5301(a) (stating “qualification as a foreign corporation under the laws
of this Commonwealth” constitutes consent to general jurisdiction).
9. See Otsuka, 106 F. Supp. 3d at 470 (interpreting registration under New
Jersey business registration statute to constitute consent to jurisdiction); Sternberg,
550 A.2d at 1116 (interpreting registration under Delaware business registration
statute to constitute consent to jurisdiction). For a discussion of the New Jersey
and Delaware cases and their impact on their respective states’ registration statutes, see infra notes 53–65 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 556 (D.
Del. 2014) (finding registration does not amount to consent based on due process
grounds discussed in Daimler). The court in AstraZeneca expressed concern that
consent-by-registration jurisdiction would offend “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.” See id. (citation omitted) (holding registration to do business does not constitute consent to jurisdiction). The court frames these issues in
the context of due process concerns. See id. (discussing the due process concerns
regarding exercise of general jurisdiction). However, at least one commentator
takes the position that due process concerns need not be addressed where consent
to jurisdiction is properly found. See Tayna J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1377–79 (2015)
(asserting need for due process discussion is obviated by presence of valid consent). For further discussion of AstraZeneca, see infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
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decision in Daimler brought on, or at least exacerbated, many of these
concerns.11
Four years after Daimler, the emerging body of law highlights both
sides of the debate.12 Since Daimler, a number of district courts in the
Third Circuit hold that consent-by-registration remains a valid manner of
obtaining personal jurisdiction.13 Still, other district courts within the
Third Circuit hold that consent-by-registration is valid only where the statutory registration provision explicitly notifies registrants of the consequences of their registration.14 Finally, a number of other district courts
within the Third Circuit hold that consent-by-registration contravenes due
process and is therefore invalid under any circumstances.15

11. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 136–39 (2014) (addressing only
contacts-based jurisdiction and omitting discussion of applying concepts to consent-based jurisdiction). For a discussion of Daimler and its impact on general jurisdiction, see infra notes 53–65 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556–57 (finding that registration to
do business in Delaware does not amount to consent to general jurisdiction). But
see, e.g., Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 587
(D. Del. 2015) (finding that registering to do business in Delaware is sufficient
consent to constitute general jurisdiction).
13. See, e.g., Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa.
2016) (citation omitted) (determining Daimler did not eliminate consent-by-registration, and upholding practice as valid conferral of general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania); Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 591 (citation omitted)
(determining that the due process concerns raised in AstraZeneca do not foreclose
on the use of consent-by-registration to obtain general jurisdiction); Otsuka, 106 F.
Supp. 3d at 468 (citation omitted) (“Nor can the [c]ourt find any support for
Mylan’s position that Daimler, in essence, precludes general jurisdiction by
consent . . . .”).
14. See, e.g., Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., No. 3:17-CV-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018 WL
1942525, at *12 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2018) (citing Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.3d 637
(3d Cir. 1991) (declining to follow Bane where New Jersey’s statutory provision
lacked the explicit jurisdiction-conferring language that Bane relied on); Bors, 208
F. Supp. 3d at 654–55 (highlighting importance of Pennsylvania’s explicit statutory
provisions and noting fatality of New Jersey statutes that lack similar explicit language conferring jurisdiction); Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 591 (stating
that a business that knowingly registers to do business in the state has “no uncertainty as to the jurisdictional consequences of its actions”). Acorda Therapeutics conflates actual knowledge, in the form of an explicit statutory provision, with actual
knowledge in the form of a non-explicit statute that has nonetheless been unambiguously “interpreted as constituting consent to general jurisdiction in that state’s
courts . . . .” See Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 591. For a further discussion of Acorda
Therapeutics, see infra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
15. See AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (determining that consent-by-registration contravenes due process). Although AstraZeneca tailored its holding to Delaware’s consent-by-registration scheme, its reliance on due process concerns would
mean that the practice of consent-by-registration, no matter where its practiced, is
invalid. See id. (determining that consent-by-registration violates due process and
is therefore invalid as a practice).
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The Third Circuit has not addressed this issue since 1991 in Bane v.
Netlink, Inc.,16 making the issue ripe for judicial comment.17 Given the
validity of consent where it is made voluntarily and knowingly, the Third
Circuit should only allow consent-by-registration to confer valid personal
jurisdiction when the a scheme provides actual notice of the consequences
of registration to registrants.18
Part II of this Comment provides a background of consent statutes
and their evolving role within the realm of jurisdiction.19 It also lays the
groundwork for those cases that have addressed consent-by-registration
since Daimler.20 Part III of this Comment analyzes the arguments made in
favor and against the practice of consent-by-registration.21 Part IV critically addresses the various arguments against the continued practice of
consent-by-registration and offers a new way of viewing the problems created by consent-by-registration schemes.22 Finally, Part V discusses the impact of the problems addressed in Part IV and provides a legislative
solution for the affected consent-by-registration schemes.23
II. FOLLOW THE YELLOW-BRICK ROAD: THE THEN-AND-NOW
CONSENT-BY-REGISTRATION JURISDICTION

OF

Among other things, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the
parties before it may hear a case.24 While the plaintiff’s presence in the
court constitutes his or her consent to jurisdiction, the battle is often
waged over whether jurisdiction exists over the defendant.25 According to
the Supreme Court, a state has general jurisdiction over a corporate defendant where its contacts are “so constant and pervasive ‘as to render [it]
16. 925 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1991).
17. See id. at 640–41 (upholding jurisdiction over defendant on the basis of
defendant’s registration to do business under Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration statute). For a further discussion of Bane, see infra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the arguments regarding the notice requirement, see
infra notes 172–85 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the background of consent-by-registration, see infra
notes 24–52 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of those cases that have addressed consent-by-registration
following Daimler, see infra notes 66–104 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the arguments made for and against consent-by-registration, see infra notes 105–47 and accompanying text.
22. For a critical analysis of the arguments made for and against consent-byregistration, see infra notes 148–85 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the impact and potential solutions to the issues
presented by consent-by-registration, see infra notes 186–204 and accompanying
text.
24. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compganie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 702–03 (1982) (citation omitted) (“The validity of an order of a federal
court depends upon that court’s having jurisdiction over both the subject matter
and the parties.”).
25. See id. (“[A]n individual may submit to the jurisdiction of the court by
appearance.”).
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essentially at home in the forum State.’”26 The Supreme Court created
this formulation so as not to offend the “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”27 When a state properly exercises general jurisdiction over a corporate defendant, that defendant may be sued for any
dispute whatsoever in that forum, regardless of whether the dispute arose
out of events that transpired in that forum.28 In other words, general jurisdiction constitutes “all-purpose” jurisdiction.29
Consensual appointment of an agent for service originated as a means
of obtaining personal jurisdiction around 1917.30 In 1991, the practice of
registration to do business as a form of consent would receive its first endorsement in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.31 Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court’s Decision in Daimler, a far more recent
commentary on general jurisdiction, potentially changed the propriety of
consent-by-registration jurisdiction.32 As such, it is necessary to appraise
the position of the various district courts in the Third Circuit following the
Daimler decision.33
A.

The Genesis of Consent-based Jurisdiction and Consent-by-registration

Over a century ago, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of statutes that require appointment an agent for service
26. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (quoting Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
27. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313 (1945) (internal citations omitted) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (stating due
process requires exercise of jurisdiction that does not offend fair play and substantial justice).
28. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 122 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919) (stating
that general jurisdiction provides the courts of the forum state the ability to properly hear “any and all claims against [the corporate defendant]”).
29. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)) (noting general jurisdiction does not require a connection between the forum and the underlying claim).
30. See Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co.,
243 U.S. 93, 94–95 (1917) (holding appointment of an agent for service of process
constituted consent to suit). For a discussion of the origins of consent-based jurisdiction, see infra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
31. See Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (determining
general jurisdiction exercised pursuant to Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration
statute was valid). For a discussion of the origins consent-by-registration jurisdiction in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 40–52 and accompanying text.
32. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 121 (2014) (holding general
jurisdiction may only be exercised where defendant’s contacts are so continuous
and systematic as to render them at home in state). For a discussion on the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler, see infra notes 53–65 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 556 (D.
Del. 2014) (finding Daimler does weigh on the issue of consent-based jurisdiction).
For a discussion on how district courts within the Third Circuit have addressed
consent-by-registration following Daimler, see infra notes 66–96 and accompanying
text.
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of process as a means obtaining personal jurisdiction.34 In Pennsylvania
Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co.,35 the
Supreme Court allowed Missouri to exercise general jurisdiction over a
defendant that appointed, via statute, an agent within the state for service
of process.36 After Pennsylvania Fire, the use of this sort of statutory consent as a means of obtaining jurisdiction found continued support in the
Court’s general jurisdiction jurisprudence.37 In 1978, Pennsylvania became the first state to enact legislation that explicitly conferred general
jurisdiction over business registrants.38 Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration statute unambiguously states that “qualification as a foreign corpora-

34. See Pennsylvania Fire, 243 U.S. at 94–95 (addressing question of using appointment of agent for service as basis for jurisdiction). In Pennsylvania Fire, the
defendant challenged the validity of service of process pursuant to a Missouri statute that required the appointment of an in-state agent for service. See id. (recounting the facts leading to the jurisdictional question). The Court placed the onus on
the defendants to determine the lengths to which the statutory language may be
interpreted. See id. at 95 (“It did appoint an agent in language that rationally
might be held to go to that length.”).
35. 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
36. See id. at 94 (holding the exercise of general jurisdiction was proper).
Specifically, the statute required that an insurance company who was licensed to
do business in Missouri file “with the superintendent of the insurance department
a power of attorney consenting that service of process upon the superintendent
should be deemed personal service upon the company so long as it should have
any liabilities outstanding in the state.” See id. (discussing the language of the statute and the jurisdictional implications).
37. See, e.g., Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165,
174–75 (1939) (holding defendant’s designation of an agent for service was sufficient consent to suit in New York courts); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355
(1927) (holding state may declare use of its highways constitutes an appointment
of agent for service and exercise general jurisdiction on that basis). The Court in
Neirbo found that a statute calling for the designation of an agent is “constitutional,
and the designation of the agent ‘a voluntary act.’ ” See Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 175
(quoting Pennsylvania Fire, 243 U.S. at 96) (holding the designation statute constitutional). The Court then determined that the appointment of the agent, as per
the statute, represented valid consent to be sued in the forum state. See id. (finding “an actual consent by Bethlehem to be sued in the courts of New York”). In
Hess, the Court considered the due process implications of requiring an individual
defendant driving in the state, by statute, to appoint an agent in the state for service of process related to his driving activities. See Hess, 274 U.S. at 355 (analyzing
statute that equated act of driving on highways to the appointment of an agent for
service). The Court determined that the state could require such an appointment
by statute without running afoul of due process considerations. See id. at 356 (citing Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916)) (holding the appointment of
agent by virtue of travel on highways valid).
38. See Gorton v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 3d 278, 296 (M.D. Pa.
2018) (considering the history of consent-by-registration in Pennsylvania). As Gorton notes, Pennsylvania remains the only state to date that “spells out the jurisdictional consequences associated with registering to do business.” See id. (quoting
Monestier, supra note 10, at 1368 (describing the status of consent-by-registration
in Pennsylvania).
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tion under the laws of this Commonwealth” constitutes a sufficient basis
for the exercise of general jurisdiction over said corporation.39
The Third Circuit addressed the validity of jurisdiction exercised pursuant to Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration statute in 1991 in Bane v.
Netlink, Inc.40 First, the court began by equating a business’s “qualification
as a foreign corporation” to a defendant’s seeking “a certificate of authority to do business in the Commonwealth . . . .”41 The court determined
that businesses, by means of their registration, “purposefully avail[ed]
[themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”42 Thus, the
Court stated that by voluntarily registering to do business in the forum,
the business knowingly consented to general jurisdiction in the forum.43
39. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301(a)(2)(i) (West 2018) (stating
the relationships that qualify as consent to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania).
40. See Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (determining
general jurisdiction exercised pursuant to Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration
statute was valid). Bane held that the district court below “failed to consider the
effect of Netlink’s application for and receipt of authorization to do business in
Pennsylvania . . . .” Id.
41. See id. (analyzing the requirements of Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration statute). Although the court does not explicitly state a definition for the statutory phrase “qualification as a foreign corporation,” it uses the phrase
interchangeably with the phrases “authorization to do business” and “registering”
to do business. See id. (using the phrases interchangeably in reference to the requirements of the statute). Specifically, the court stated:
In so holding, the court failed to consider the effect of Netlink’s application for and receipt of authorization to do business in Pennsylvania . . . .
Pennsylvania law explicitly states that the qualification of a foreign corporation to do business is sufficient contact to serve as the basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.
Id. (emphasis added).
42. See id. (alteration in original) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (determining that
the registration to do business constituted consent to jurisdiction under the Pennsylvania statute). It is noteworthy that Burger King used the phrase, “purposeful
availment” when discussing specific jurisdiction over the corporate defendant. See
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (describing the conditions under which specific jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant). However, in Bane, the court used the
language to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendant via Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration statute. See Bane, 925 F.2d at 640 (adapting the
language of Burger King to an application of general jurisdiction). However, this
import from Burger King did not come without limiting language. See Int’l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (discussing requirement that underlying claim have a relation to forum state). As the Supreme Court stated in International Shoe:
[T]he exercise of [the privilege of doing business in the forum] may give
rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are
connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires
the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in
most instances, hardly be said to be undue.
Id. (emphasis added).
43. See Bane, 925 F.2d at 641 (finding the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over defendant valid). The court stated that Netlink “should have been ‘reasona-
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Unlike Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware do not have explicit
statutory provisions that purport to confer jurisdiction on registrants.44 In
Sternberg v. O’Neil,45 the Delaware Supreme Court first interpreted the Delaware business registration statute.46 It stated that the statute conferred
jurisdiction on an express consent theory via the business registration process, despite the fact that Delaware’s statute does not mention jurisdiction
at all.47 In doing so, the court relied in large part on Pennsylvania Fire,
determining that appointment of an agent for service of process represents express consent to jurisdiction.48
The path to consent-by-registration in New Jersey largely tracked that
of Delaware.49 In a 2015 opinion, the District of New Jersey determined
that New Jersey’s business registration statutes conferred general jurisdicbly able to anticipate being haled into court’ in Pennsylvania.” Id. (quoting Provident Nat’l Bank v. California Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir.
1987)).
44. Compare 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301(a) (West 2018) (stating
explicitly registration to do business constitutes consent to general jurisdiction),
with DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 376(a) (West 2018) (omitting any mention that registration amounts to consent to general jurisdiction), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:4-1
(West 2018) (omitting any mention of jurisdictional language).
45. 550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988), abrogated by Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137
A.3d 123 (Del. 2016).
46. See id. at 1109 (addressing question of whether Delaware may exercise
jurisdiction over foreign corporation based on qualification to do business in the
state).
47. See id. at 1116 (determining that registration to do business in Delaware
constituted express consent). Although the statute lacks any specific language similar to that of Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction-conferring registration statute, the Supreme Court of Delaware concluded that compliance with Delaware’s registration
statue constituted “[e]xpress consent to jurisdiction.” See id. (terming the consent
“express” despite lacking jurisdictional language in statute).
48. See id. (citations omitted) (“Express consent to jurisdiction by a foreign
corporation takes the form of an appointment of a statutory agent to receive service of process . . . .”). It is important that the court defined the state’s consent-byregistration practice as express consent, because “[w]hen jurisdiction is based on
implied consent, ‘[t]he Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest
in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties or relations.’ ” Id. at 1112 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
49. Compare id. at 1116 (determining registration to do business in Delaware
constitutes express consent to jurisdiction), with Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan, Inc.,
106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 469–70 (D.N.J. 2015) (interpreting a registration statute without any jurisdictional language to confer general jurisdiction over registrants).
Like Delaware, New Jersey’s registration statutes do not explicitly confer such jurisdiction. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 376(a) (2018) (omitting any mention of consent or jurisdiction related to registration); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:4-1 (West 2018)
(omitting any similar mention). Thus, the statutes required the interpretation of
the court to gain the ability to confer general jurisdiction over registrants. See Otsuka, 106 F. Supp. 3d at 469 (citations omitted) (holding that designation of an
agent can constitute consent “if supported by the breadth of the statute’s text or
interpretation”).
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tion over registrants.50 The court relied in part on the Third Circuit’s decision in Bane, citing it for the proposition that the registrant had
“purposefully avail[ed] itself” of the benefits of the laws of New Jersey and
noting that the interpretation of a registration statute can support a finding of personal jurisdiction.51 As such, the court interpreted the text of
New Jersey’s registration statute as constituting consent to jurisdiction;
50. See id. at 469–70 (holding New Jersey business registration statute confers
general jurisdiction over registrants). Relying on district court cases from Delaware, the court asserted that Daimler had not “preclude[d] general jurisdiction by
consent . . . .” See id. at 468 (first citing Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm.,
Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 588–89 (D. Del. 2015); and then citing Forest Labs., Inc.
v. Amneal Pharms. LLC, No. 14-508-LPS, 2015 WL 880599, at *13 (D. Del. Feb. 26,
2015)) (determining that consent-based jurisdiction is not precluded by Daimler).
51. See id. at 468–69 (discussing Bane and its impact on registration statutes as
a basis for consent jurisdiction). At least one commentator argues that courts tend
to only address part of the concerns when determining the continued validity of
consent-by-registration. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1738 (discussing the conclusions necessary to reach a finding that consent-by-registration is valid). While
courts are quick to state that consent remains a valid form of obtaining jurisdiction, the courts rarely address whether registration itself is properly considered
valid consent. See id. (stating courts often presume registration is a form of valid
consent). But see Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 1961 802 EDA 2018, 2018 WL
3025283, at *6–7 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. May 30, 2018) (addressing the notion that consent is not valid on the grounds of involuntariness). Mallory declined to exercise
general personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation, resting its argument
in large part on the theory that the “[d]efendant’s consent to jurisdiction was not
voluntary.” See id. at *6 (analyzing the propriety of registration as a valid form of
consent). The court determined that the binary choice presented to corporations—either register and consent or refrain from doing business in Pennsylvania—did not amount to a voluntary choice. See id. at *7 (determining that no
practical choice exists). In addressing Supreme Court precedent including Pennsylvania Fire, the court refers to them as “relics of the Pennoyer era.” See id. at *12
(citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877)) (stating older Supreme Court
precedent must be interpreted in light of its more recent general jurisdiction pronouncements). However, this view must be contrasted with that of a few courts
that have determined that, in at least one state, “ ‘doing business’ is a question of
fact to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.” See Univ. of Dominica v. Pa. Coll. of
Podiatric Med., 446 A.2d 1339, 1341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (citation omitted) (noting there are actions a business can take in a state without necessarily doing business); see also Wenzel v. Morris Distrib. Co., 266 A.2d 662, 666–67 (Pa. 1970)
(noting similar actions, including use of an independent contractor). In Wenzel,
the court stated that a corporation could utilize independent contractors within
the forum state without necessarily having to register to do business. See Wenzel,
266 A.2d at 666–67 (describing one action a business may take without being considering as doing business in the forum). The court contrasted the use of independent contractors with those corporations that “entered [or] conducted activities in
the Commonwealth,” suggesting that there are activities that can be accomplished
by a corporation in Pennsylvania that do not require registration. See id. (contrasting activities that constitute doing business from those that do not). Following a
sweeping overhaul of Pennsylvania’s statutes relating to corporate registration in
2015, the legislature explicitly confirmed that “selling through independent contractors,” along with ten other enumerated actions, does not implicate the need
for registration to do business in the Commonwealth. See 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 403(a)(5) (West 2018) (enumerating the actions a business may take
without necessarily doing business within the state).
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however, the Supreme Court’s most recent general jurisdiction pronouncement raises questions about the validity of this interpretation.52
B.

Enter: Daimler, The Great and Powerful

In 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States clarified the concept
of general jurisdiction based on a minimum contacts analysis.53 Daimler,
a German defendant, was hauled into federal court in California to answer
claims brought by Argentinian workers under Argentina and California
laws.54 Plaintiffs in the action asserted that general jurisdiction over
Daimler was proper because of the contacts that Mercedes-Benz USA,
Daimler’s subsidiary, had with the forum state.55 Although rejected at
first, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately accepted this argument, and found that the court properly exercised general jurisdiction
over Daimler.56
However, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
holding that a corporate defendant is amenable to general jurisdiction
only where its contacts are so continuous and systematic that the defendant corporation is essentially “at home” in the state where jurisdiction is
sought.57 As for those locales that satisfy such a demanding test, the Court
noted that the corporation’s “place of incorporation” and “principal place
52. See Otsuka, 106 F. Supp. 3d at 469 (likening New Jersey’s statute to Pennsylvania’s as addressed in Bane, despite lacking jurisdictional language).
53. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 121 (2014) (“The question
presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the District Court from exercising jurisdiction over Daimler in this case,
given the absence of any California connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or
victims described in the complaint.”).
54. See id. (noting the location of each party for the purpose of setting the
stage for a jurisdiction discussion). The plaintiffs sought damages for human
rights violations allegedly perpetuated by Daimler’s Argentinian subsidiary during
the period of Argentina’s “Dirty War.” See id. (recounting the facts that led to the
jurisdictional question).
55. See id. (stating plaintiffs’ theory of personal jurisdiction). Mercedes-Benz
USA (MBUSA) is a subsidiary of Daimler that is incorporated in Delaware with its
principal place of business in New Jersey. See id. (noting the relationship between
the parent and subsidiary corporations).
56. See id. at 124 (describing the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the jurisdiction
issue). In its first hearing, the Ninth Circuit declined to allow California to exercise general jurisdiction over Daimler because of a lack of agency between MBUSA
and Daimler. See id. (stating the initial reasoning of the Ninth Circuit). Without
agency, the plaintiffs were unable to attribute MBUSA’s contacts to Daimler. See
id. (noting the need to draw a connection between MBUSA and Daimler). However, on rehearing, the panel withdrew its initial opinion and allowed for the exercise of general jurisdiction over Daimler. See id. (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s
shift in reasoning). A subsequent request for a rehearing en banc was denied. See
id. at 125 (noting procedural posture of case before it reached Supreme Court).
57. See id. at 137 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)) (“Goodyear made clear that only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction
there.”).
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of business” are where the corporation will most likely be “at home.”58
Finding that Daimler’s contacts were not so continuous and systematic as
to render it “at home” in California, the Court declined to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendant car manufacturer in that
state.59
The Supreme Court made clear that a view of general jurisdiction
that allows for its exercise every time a corporation “engages in substantial,
continuous, and systematic” contacts would be “unacceptably grasping.”60
In doing so, the Court set a high bar for litigants to meet in order to show
that a locale beyond the corporation’s “place of incorporation and principal place of business” warrant diverting from those “paradigm . . . bases” of
jurisdiction.61 Nonetheless, the Court’s only mention of consent as a
means of obtaining jurisdiction came in a passing reference to Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,62 stating that Perkins v. Benguet Con58. See id. at 137 (noting the two locales that most commonly satisfy the test).
The Court noted that while other locales exist in which a corporation can be amenable to general jurisdiction, these are the two “paradigm” bases. See id. (describing the scope of the test). Although noting that other forums may exist, the Court
limited the range of options by barring the exercise of general jurisdiction based
solely on “substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business.” See id. at
137–38 (citation omitted) (limiting the potential scope of the test).
59. See id. at 139 (“[N]either Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in California, nor does either entity have its principal place of business there.”). The Court
went on to reject the idea that general jurisdiction could be exercised in “every
other State in which MBUSA’s sales are sizable.” See id. (limiting the scope of general jurisdiction).
60. See id. at 138 (reaffirming that the corporation need be virtually at home
in forum for general jurisdiction to be proper). In rejecting the use of continuous
and systematic contacts alone, the Court reiterated that this language appears in
the context of specific jurisdiction. See id. (differentiating between specific and
general jurisdiction). International Shoe used the language “continuous and systematic” to define the type of contacts that would suffice to meet specific jurisdiction
standards. See id. (citing Int’l Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945))
(describing the test for specific jurisdiction). The Court then reiterated that the
test for general jurisdiction doesn’t end with “continuous and systematic” contacts;
rather, the “affiliations with the state [must be] so ‘continuous and systematic’ as
to render [the corporation] essentially at home in the forum State.” See id. at
138–39 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919) (making clear the distinction between the
tests for specific and general jurisdiction).
61. See id. at 137 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924) (noting other locales exist
but placing heavy limits beyond the two paradigm bases). While the Court does
not provide any examples of bases of general jurisdiction outside of the state of
incorporation and principal place of business, it foreclosed on the idea that sizable
sales alone would be enough to render a corporation “at home” in the forum state.
See id. at 139 (noting Daimler’s sales presence in California is insufficient to meet
the test for general jurisdiction). In doing so, the court stated that “such exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state defendants ‘to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.’ ” Id. (quoting Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
62. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
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sol. Mining Co.63 is the proper test for general jurisdiction where the corporation has not consented to jurisdiction.64 Thus, lower courts are left with
little direct commentary on which to ground the debate over Daimler’s effect on consent-based jurisdiction.65
C.

The Landscape of Consent-by-registration after Daimler

One of the most common concerns for district courts involves the
potential for conflict between Daimler’s due process requirements and the
doctrine of consent-by-registration jurisdiction.66 Tangential to that concern is the possibility that some courts conflate contacts with consent in
applying contacts-based doctrines to consent-based jurisdiction.67 Beyond
that, some district courts focus more exclusively on the notice requirements for jurisdiction and how such a requirement either precludes or
supports consent-by-registration.68
1.

On the Question of Daimler and Due Process Preclusion

In the wake of Daimler, district courts within the Third Circuit needed
to re-examine the validity of their consent-by-registration schemes.69
Many courts ultimately decided that Daimler did not eliminate consent as a
means of obtaining jurisdiction.70 This theory emerged from Daimler’s
failure to explain how consent jurisdiction fits into the larger general jurisdiction landscape.71
63. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
64. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 129 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 927–28) (acknowledging a difference between consent-based
and contacts-based jurisdiction).
65. See, e.g., Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648, 654–55 (E.D. Pa.
2016) (finding Daimler does not weight on the issue of consent-based jurisdiction).
66. For a discussion of district court examination of Daimler, due process, and
consent-by-registration, see infra notes 69–83 and accompanying text.
67. For a discussion of district court analysis of the difference between consent and contacts based jurisdiction, see infra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
68. For a discussion of district court analysis of notice, see infra notes 90–96
and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 556 (D.
Del. 2014) (noting the need to reexamine consent-by-registration in light of
Daimler). “The court finds, however, that Daimler does weigh on this issue.” Id.
70. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prods. Inc., 5:18-CV-00699,
2018 WL 3707377, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2018) (holding Daimler does not preclude consent-based jurisdiction).
71. See Allstate, 2018 WL 3707377, at *5 (“This court is persuaded by the reasoning of those courts that have found that the Supreme Court in Daimler did not
mean ‘sub silentio, to eliminate consent as a basis for jurisdiction.’ ” (quoting
Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 591 (D. Del.
2015))); see also Gorton v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 3d 278, 298 (M.D.
Pa. 2018) (“Daimler did not abdicate or overrule Bane, and after 1978 under section
5301 a corporation that applies for and receives a certificate of authority to do
business in Pennsylvania consents to the general jurisdiction of state and federal
courts in Pennsylvania.”); Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648, 653
(E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 468
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However, the District of Delaware determined just months after
Daimler that the newly-minted “at home” test precluded the use of consentby-registration to obtain general jurisdiction.72 The court in AstraZeneca
AB v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.73 determined that Daimler’s near-silence
on consent did not change the fact that jurisdiction via consent is still
subject to the constraint that it must not offend “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice . . . .”74 The court concluded that Daimler precludes the practice of exercising jurisdiction over a corporation simply because they do business in the forum state.75
The Delaware Supreme Court and the District of New Jersey echoed
this concern regarding Daimler’s preclusion of consent-by-registration.76
Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec77 took a practical perspective, recognizing that
Daimler set a high bar for general jurisdiction to be exercised outside of
the state of incorporation and principal place of business.78 The court in
(D.N.J. 2015)) (“The ruling in Daimler does not eliminate consent to general personal jurisdiction over a corporation registered to do business in Pennsylvania.”).
72. See AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (“In light of the holding in
Daimler, . . . [defendant’s] compliance with Delaware’s registration statutes—
mandatory for doing business within the state—cannot constitute consent to jurisdiction . . . .”). The court went on to state that the corporate defendant at issue in
the case, being registered to do business in over twelve states would be exposed “to
suit all over the country, a result specifically at odds with Daimler.” See id. at 556–57
(citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138–41 (2014)) (describing the concerns with using registration as consent to general jurisdiction).
73. 72 F. Supp. 3d 549 (D. Del. 2014).
74. See id. at 556 (discussing the due process limits of general jurisdiction as
set forth in Daimler). The court asserts here that all bases of jurisdiction are subject
to some level of due process scrutiny related to the notions of “fair play” and “justice.” See id. (applying Daimler’s general jurisdiction limits to contacts-based and
consent-based jurisdiction alike). However, this notion has been disputed by at
least one commentator. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1378 (asserting that due
process concerns do not apply where the basis for jurisdiction is valid consent).
For a discussion of the opposition to the need for due process where consent is the
basis for jurisdiction, see infra notes 126–30 and accompanying text.
75. AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138–41).
76. See Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., No. 3:17-CV-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018 WL
1942525, at *12 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2018) (determining that Daimler has precluded
the practice of registration as a basis for jurisdiction); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec,
137 A.3d 123, 126–128 (Del. 2016) (holding Daimler precluded the practice of registration as a basis for jurisdiction). Horowitz stated that “consent-by-registration is
inconsistent with Daimler.” Horowitz, 2018 WL 1942525, at *12. Further, the court
posited that “Daimler also advised that older decisions addressing general jurisdiction over a corporation should be afforded little weight.” Id. (citing Daimler, 571
U.S. at 138 n.18). The court in Genuine Parts stated that the interpretation given to
Delaware’s business registration statutes by Sternberg “rested on a view of federal
jurisprudence that has now been fundamentally undermined by Daimler . . . .” See
Genuine Parts, 137 A.3d at 126 (changing the previous interpretation of Delaware’s
registration statute to strip it of its ability to constitute consent to jurisdiction).
77. 137 A.3d 123 (Del. 2016).
78. See id. at 135–36. (acknowledging that jurisdiction might, “in an exceptional case,” be proper in a locale other than the state of incorporation or principal place of business (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19)).
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Genuine Parts also pointed to Daimler’s prohibition on the use of “continuous and systematic” contacts alone, noting that consent-by-registration
would equate to even fewer contacts.79 In a similar vein, the court in
Horowitz v. AT&T, Inc.80 determined that prior “sweeping interpretation”
of the exercise of general jurisdiction have since “yielded to the doctrinal
refinement reflected in Goodyear and Daimler . . . .”81 Notwithstanding, the
court in Bors v. Johnson & Johnson82 disagreed with this rationale, stating
that Daimler prohibited the use of continuous and systematic contacts by
themselves to establish jurisdiction and leaving untouched the use of consent to obtain jurisdiction.83
2.

Distinguishing Consent from Contacts

Setting aside those courts that found Daimler fatal to consent-by-registration, a majority of federal district courts representing states within the
Third Circuit uphold the continued validity of consent-by-registration after Daimler.84 The courts focus on Daimler’s lack of a discussion regarding
consent to jurisdiction as evidence that it did not preclude the practice.85
79. See id. at 136 (determining that consent-by-registration falls below even
continuous and systematic contacts). For a discussion of Daimler’s prohibition on
the continuous and systematic test in the context of consent jurisdiction, see infra
notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
80. No. 3:17-cv-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018 WL 1942525, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 25,
2018).
81. See id. at *12 (quoting Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, 182 F. Supp. 3d 166,
178 (D.N.J. 2016)) (noting that prior general jurisdiction case law should be interpreted in light of recent Supreme Court decisions). The court in Horowitz agreed
with the rationale from Display Works. See id. (“The [c]ourt finds Judge Arleo’s
reasoning in Display Works persuasive.”). Namely, Horowitz concluded that older
decisions like Pennsylvania Fire should not be given the weight that they once were,
given the “[Supreme] Court’s 21st century approach to general and specific jurisdiction in light of expectations created by the continuing expansion of interstate
and global business.” Id. (quoting Display Works, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 178).
82. 208 F. Supp. 3d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
83. Id. at 654 (emphasis added) (quoting Pfizer Inc. v. Mylan Inc., Civ. A. No.
15-26-SLR-SRF, 2016 WL 1319700, at *10 (D. Del. Apr. 4, 2016)).
84. See, e.g., Bors, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 655 (“Consent remains a valid form of
establishing personal jurisdiction under the Pennsylvania registration statute after
Daimler.”); Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 468 (D.N.J.
2015) (“Daimler in its entirety contains but one fleeting reference to the concept of
jurisdiction by consent, and this limited reference served only to distinguish between traditional ‘consensual’ jurisdiction and the ‘non-consensual bases for jurisdiction’ addressed in the decision . . . .”) (citing Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan
Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 589 (D. Del. 2015)) (“[Daimler] preserves what has
long been the case: that these are two distinct manners of obtaining jurisdiction
over a corporation.”).
85. See Bors, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 653 (“Daimler did not overrule ‘nearly centuryold Supreme Court precedent regarding what amounts to voluntary consent to
jurisdiction when (1) Daimler never says it is doing any such thing; and (2) what
Daimler does say about consent to jurisdiction suggests just the opposite.’ ” (quoting
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharms. LLC, No. 14-508-LPS, 2015 WL 880599, at *13
(D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015))); Otsuka, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 468 (characterizing Daimler’s
treatment of consent as “one fleeting reference”); Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp.
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This argument became the cornerstone of Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,86 a District of Delaware case that departed from
the previously-decided AstraZeneca matter.87 The case, decided just three
months after AstraZeneca, determined that Daimler’s single reference to
consent was effectively “distinguish[ing] between consensual and non-consensual bases for jurisdiction.”88 The court determined that due process
concerns do not reach a situation where jurisdiction is premised on a statute that carries with it a longstanding interpretation that registration constitutes consent.89
3.

Notice as a Crucial Concern

Beyond the issue of squaring consent-by-registration with Daimler, the
issue of notice has been discussed by various district courts as a poison pill
3d at 589 (“Indeed, in the entire opinion in Daimler, there is but a single, passing
reference to the concept of consent . . . .”).
86. 78 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D. Del. 2015).
87. See id. at 589–90 (declining to follow the previously-decided case of AstraZeneca and upholding consent-by-registration in Delaware). AstraZeneca focused
on the due process implications of squaring Daimler’s prohibition on the sole use
of continuous and systematic contacts to gain jurisdiction over a defendant. See
AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 556 (D. Del. 2014)
(noting registration falls below continuous and systematic contacts let alone
Daimler’s heightened standard for general jurisdiction). Acorda Therapeutics, on the
other hand, focused on the distinction between consent to jurisdiction and jurisdiction via the minimum contacts analysis. See Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at
589–90 (noting the distinction between consent-based and contacts-based jurisdiction). In rebutting AstraZeneca’s concern about the failure of consent-by-registration to meet the due process notice requirements, the court in Acorda Therapeutics
stated, “[w]hen, instead, the basis for jurisdiction is the voluntary compliance with
a state’s registration statute, which has long and unambiguously been interpreted
as constituting consent to general jurisdiction in that state’s courts, the corporation can have no uncertainty as to the jurisdictional consequences of its actions.” Id.
at 591 (emphasis added). In fact, the court stated that the minimum contacts
analysis provides more jurisdictional uncertainty than consent-by-registration. See
id. (describing how consent-based jurisdiction provides corporations certainty of
potential forums).
88. See id. at 589 (analyzing Daimler’s sole mention of consent). The court
made explicit that “general jurisdiction may be established by showing that a corporation is ‘at home’ in the sense described in detail in Daimler, or separately,
general jurisdiction may be established by a corporation’s consent to such jurisdiction.” Id. The court further noted that while Daimler was instructive on the former, it had “nothing to say about the latter scenario.” See id. (noting Daimler did
not rule on the propriety of consent-based jurisdiction).
89. Id. at 591. This line of reasoning squares with the reasoning of at least
one commentator that due process concerns need not be addressed where the
basis for jurisdiction is “voluntary” compliance with the statute. See Monestier,
supra note 10, at 1359 (asserting due process concerns are obviated by valid consent to jurisdiction). However, there are concerns about conflating statutes that
contain explicit statutory language, like that of Pennsylvania, with statutes that
have just been “long and unambiguously . . . interpreted as constituting consent to
general jurisdiction.” See Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 591.
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to certain consent-by-registration schemes.90 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Bors relied on the explicit nature of Pennsylvania’s statute as a
key to its survival.91 The court distinguished the Pennsylvania statute,
which contained explicit jurisdiction-conferring language, from a similar
New Jersey statute lacking such language—notably, the lack of this language was the sole reason the court invalidated this New Jersey statute.92
The Court in Horowitz declined to blindly follow the Third Circuit’s
decision in Bane regarding New Jersey’s consent-by-registration scheme because New Jersey’s statute lacked the explicit language found in its Pennsylvania counterpart.93 As was the case with Bors, the explicit language in
90. See Gorton v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 3d 278, 297 (M.D. Pa.
2018) (“This court agrees that merely registering as a foreign corporation with a
state—in the absence of specific statutory language providing otherwise—does not
equate to the foreign corporation being ‘at home’ in the state . . . .”); Horowitz v.
AT&T Inc., No. 3:17-CV-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018 WL 1942525, at *12 (D.N.J. Apr. 25,
2018) (“The Court agrees that Bane is distinguishable due to the differences in the
Pennsylvania and New Jersey corporation registration statutes. Notably, the New
Jersey Statute does not contain any express language to put a corporation on notice that by registering to do business in New Jersey, it is also consenting to personal jurisdiction in the state.”).
91. See Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648, 654–55 (E.D. Pa.
2016) (noting the jurisdiction conferring language of Pennsylvania’s registration
statute). The court noted that other courts have “distinguished Pennsylvania’s specific notice statute in comparing other states’ statutes.” Id. at 654. In one instance,
a Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision “used Pennsylvania’s statute as an example of providing notice registering to do business in a state will subject a corporation to general personal jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Brown v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 637 (2d Cir. 2016)).
92. See id. at 654–55 (citing Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, 182 F. Supp. 3d
166, 175 (D.N.J. 2016)) (comparing the explicit jurisdictional language in Pennsylvania’s statute with others lacking similar language). In Display Works, the court
clarified two key considerations in the practice of consent-by-registration. See Display Works, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 179 (analyzing the requirements of valid consent-byregistration). Foremost, the court clarified that “consent and contacts are not interdependent.” See id. (stating a defendant may consent to jurisdiction even where
minimum contacts is not met). Thus, it is the registration that matters for the
purposes of consent, not the act of doing business pursuant to the registration. See
id. (distinguishing between registration to do business and actually doing business). Second, Display Works clarified that a consent-by-registration scheme can be
found invalid solely on the basis that the relevant statutes fail to reference consent
or general jurisdiction. See id. at 175–76 (stating that New Jersey registration statutes “do not contain any language intimating that the foreign corporation will be
subject to suit in this state for conduct that occurred elsewhere, and do not discuss
consent. That absence of any such language distinguishes New Jersey’s statutes
from those in Bane”). The court’s holding stated explicitly that the statutes failed
to confer general jurisdiction “because they do not contain express references to
any such terms.” See id. at 179 (finding New Jersey’s registration statute could not
confer valid consent based on a lack of jurisdictional language in the statute).
93. See Horowitz, 2018 WL 1942525, at *12 (relying on the jurisdictional language distinction to justify diverging from Bane). But see Oscar G. Chase, Consent to
Judicial Jurisdiction: The Foundation Of “Registration” Statutes, 73 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 159, 198 (2018) (stating that “Pennsylvania Fire itself forecloses arguments
that actual notice need be given in statute to affect registration jurisdiction”). Although the court in Horowitz declined to follow Bane on the distinction of actual
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Pennsylvania’s statute was key to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
Gorton v. Air & Liquid System Corporation94 finding that consent-by-registration remains valid following Daimler.95 Notwithstanding, much of the support for consent-by-registration remains contained in the Third Circuit.96
D.

Consent-by-registration Elsewhere in the Nation

A majority of federal courts outside of the Third Circuit hold that
registration to do business within a forum cannot constitute consent to
jurisdiction.97 Genuine Parts collected cases from district courts presiding
in the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits that heard the issue
notice, at least one commentator asserts that actual notice need not be given for a
consent-by-registration scheme to survive. See Horowitz, 2018 WL 1942525 at *12.
But see Chase, supra, at 198 (pointing to early Supreme Court precedent on the
need for notice). The commentator notes the Second Circuit’s commentary on
Pennsylvania statute in Brown v. Lockheed Martin, requiring that consent-by-registration schemes in the Second Circuit provide express notice in the statute of the
consequences of registering. See id. at 197 (citing Brown, 814 F.3d at 637-38) (providing an example case where notice was the lynchpin of the consent analysis).
However, the commentator cites to Pennsylvania Fire’s proposition that the onus is
on the defendant in “anticipating the effects of its registration.” See id. at 198 (citing Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243
U.S. 93, 96 (1917)) (arguing defendant bears burden of knowing where they can
be brought to suit). Thus, the commentator concludes, “there is no support for a
rule that a state must provide specific notice or obtain actual formal consent from
a defendant to obtain jurisdiction over it.” Id.
94. 303 F. Supp. 3d 278 (M.D. Pa. 2018).
95. See id. at 297 (holding Pennsylvania’s explicit registration provision confers valid personal jurisdiction). In addition, there is inconsistency among commentators on where the issue of notice fits into the calculus. See Chase, supra note
93, at 197 (analyzing notice as a separate due process concern apart from the requirements of consent). One commentator explicitly states that “[a]nother due
process concern raised by commentators and courts is that corporations lack adequate notice that registration will subject them to general jurisdiction.” Id. However, as another commentator notes, there is case law to support the argument that
due process need not be addressed where consent is validly found. See Monestier,
supra note 10, at 1378 (analyzing notice as part of the two requirements for consent). In either case, there is support for a third position that notice can be addressed separate of the due process considerations as part of the requirements for
valid consent in the first place. See id. at 1359 (arguing that consent must be knowing and voluntary).
96. See Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding use
of Pennsylvania’s registration statute as means to confer jurisdiction over corporations registered in the forum). For a discussion of other jurisdictions, see infra
notes 97–104.
97. Gorton, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 296 (citing Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137
A.3d 123, 145 (Del. 2016)). Gorton noted, before upholding Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration scheme, that the national landscape does not generally support
the use of consent-by-registration. See id. (surveying the national status of consentby-registration). However, it was the “specific statutory language” of Pennsylvania’s
registration statutes that convinced the court in Gorton that it was not at odds with
Daimler. See id. at 297 (noting Pennsylvania’s statute differs from all others in its
explicit language).
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following Daimler.98 District Courts within the Second and Fifth Circuits
nullified consent-by-registration based on the theory that merely “doing
business” in the state was not enough to meet the requirements of
Daimler’s “at home” test.99
In tandem with the argument that Daimler has foreclosed on the practice of consent-by-registration is the notion that the practice, if allowed,
will run rampant.100 The Second and Eighth Circuits relied on this policybased theory that allowing every state to exercise consent-by-registration

98. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:14-cv-01492-TWPDKL, 2015 WL 5971126, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 14, 2015) (holding that neither
“merely registering to do business in Indiana” nor “registering to do business in
Indiana and also appointing an agent for service” establishes personal jurisdiction
over a corporation); Hazim v. Schiel & Denver Pub. Ltd., No. H-12-1286, 2015 WL
5227955, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2015) (citation omitted) (“The Fifth Circuit has
held that ‘the mere act’ of registering a corporate agent in the forum state who is
then served with process shows neither general jurisdiction in Texas nor ‘consent
to be hauled into Texas courts on any dispute with any party anywhere concerning
any matter.’ ”); Pitts v. Ford Motor Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d 676, 683 (S.D. Miss. 2015)
(declining to exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where the
only theory asserted is qualification and registration to do business under Mississippi laws); Keeley v. Pfizer Inc., No. 4:15CV00583 ERW, 2015 WL 3999488, at *4
(E.D. Mo. July 1, 2015) (citation omitted) (determining that exercising general
jurisdiction on the sole basis of registration to do business “is contrary to the holding in Daimler that merely doing business in a state is not enough to establish general jurisdiction”); Neeley v. Wyeth LLC, No. 4:11-cv-00325-JAR, 2015 WL 1456984,
at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2015) (finding Daimler rejected notion of subjecting
“every foreign corporation transacting business in the state of Missouri” to general
jurisdiction); Chatwal Hotels & Resorts LLC v. Dollywood Co., 90 F. Supp. 3d 97,
105 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citations omitted) (determining, after Daimler, the “mere fact
of [a defendant’s] being registered to do business is insufficient to confer general
jurisdiction”).
99. See Pitts, 127 F. Supp. 3d at 683 (applying Daimler “at home” test to consent-based jurisdiction); Chatwal Hotels, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 105 (applying Daimler “at
home” test to consent-based jurisdiction). The court in Pitts determined that the
registration to do business and appointment of an agent for the service of process
constituted “at most ‘doing business.’ ” See Pitts, 127 F. Supp. 3d at 683 (finding
doing business was not enough to allow for general jurisdiction under Daimler).
Chatwal Hotels similarly noted that “courts were unwilling to find that registering to
do business in the state, without more, was enough to confer general jurisdiction
over an entity . . . .” Chatwal Hotels, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 105. However, this characterization of the registration as a sort of contact to be analyzed within the minimum
contacts framework runs afoul of the notion that consent and contacts are two
separate bases of jurisdiction. See Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648,
653–54 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (differentiating between consent-based and contacts-based
jurisdiction).
100. See Keeley, 2015 WL 3999488, at *4 (agreeing with the Supreme Court in
Daimler that “[s]uch exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely
permit out-of-state defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit.” (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138–41 (2014))); see also
Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016) (expressing
concern about the wide reach of consent-by-registration jurisdiction).
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would lead to “national companies . . . subject to suit all over the
country.”101
However, as one commentator points out, the practice of consent-byregistration nationwide is objectively minimal.102 As of 2015, all fifty states
and the District of Columbia maintain business registration statutes, but
only “six states have made it clear that registration to do business results in
‘consent’ to general jurisdiction.”103 This result comes nearly a century after
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Pennsylvania

101. See Keeley, 2015 WL 3999488, at *4 (noting the breadth of jurisdiction
that would result from consent-by-registration jurisdiction); see also Brown, 814 F.3d
at 640 (noting the breadth of jurisdiction that would result from consent-by-registration jurisdiction). The court in Brown distinguished Pennsylvania’s statute from
that of Connecticut, which it called “ambiguous.” See id. at 640 (comparing Pennsylvania’s explicit statute with that of Connecticut). The court expressed fear that
mere registration and the accompanying appointment of an in-state
agent—without an express consent to general jurisdiction—nonetheless
sufficed to confer general jurisdiction by implicit consent, every corporation would be subject to general jurisdiction in every state in which it
registered, and Daimler’s ruling would be robbed of meaning by a backdoor thief.
Id. It is unclear if the Second Circuit purposely left the door open for statutory
schemes like that of Pennsylvania by setting off “express consent to general jurisdiction” from the rest of the proposition. See id. (acknowledging Pennsylvania’s
explicit statutory attempt to confer jurisdiction through registration).
102. See Kevin D. Benish, Note, Pennoyer’s Ghost: Consent, Registration Statutes,
And General Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609, 1647
(2015) (surveying impact of business registration statutes nationwide). This Article’s appendix belies many of the fears that courts have raised in opposition to
consent-by-registration. See, e.g., Brown, 814 F.3d at 640 (stating that use of consent-by-registration will lead to “every corporation . . . subject to general jurisdiction in every state in which it registered ”); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d
123, 143 (Del. 2016) (“Human experience shows that ‘grasping’ behavior by one,
can lead to grasping behavior by everyone . . . .” (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138)).
While the Article ultimately calls for the disuse of consent-by-registration, the appendix presents a state-by-state list, detailing the effects of business registration
statutes nationwide. See Benish, supra, at 164–61 (amalgamating business registration statutes of each state). The first important takeaway from the appendix is that
there are very few states that have written or interpreted their registration statutes
to confer personal jurisdiction over registrant defendants. See id. (noting small
number of statutes that are interpreted to confer jurisdiction). The second is that
there are a large number of states that have not yet interpreted the meaning of
their registration statutes. See id. (noting large number of statutes yet to be
interpreted).
103. See Benish, supra note 102, at 1647 (stating number of statutes interpreted to confer jurisdiction). At the time the Article was written, New Jersey had
not “clearly” interpreted its statute to establish general jurisdiction over the defendant corporation. See id. at 1655 (acknowledging statutes without clear interpretation). They have since done so. See Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan, Inc., 106 F. Supp.
3d 456, 470 (D.N.J. 2015) (interpreting New Jersey’s business registration statute
to confer jurisdiction over registrants). For a discussion on New Jersey’s interpretation of its business registration statute as conferring general jurisdiction, see
supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
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Fire, which allowed for the use of consent statutes as a means of obtaining
jurisdiction.104
III. TOTO, WE ARE NOT IN F]DAIMLER ANYMORE: AN ANALYSIS OF
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST CONSENT-BY-REGISTRATION

THE

Although some courts assert the opposite, Daimler has not precluded
consent-by-registration.105 Furthermore, despite the position that consent-by-registration does not comport with due process requirements, a
due process analysis is unnecessary where consent is validly given.106 Notwithstanding, some courts still forbid the practice on the grounds that registration is not a voluntary or knowing form of consent.107
A.

Has Daimler Precluded Consent-by-registration?

Courts that decline to extend consent-by-registration often rely on the
theory that Daimler itself precludes the practice.108 The opinions tend to
split over what language in Daimler is truly dispositive.109 One school of
thought posits that Daimler’s silence on consent as a means of obtaining
jurisdiction indicates that the opinion did not seek to affect the longstand104. See Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling
Co., 243 U.S. 93, 94–95 (1917) (holding statutory appointment of agent for service
constitutes consent to suit in forum). For a discussion on Pennsylvania Fire, see
supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
105. For further discussion on the argument for preclusion of consent-by-registration, see infra notes 108–20 and accompanying text.
106. For further discussion on the argument that consent-by-registration violates due process, see infra notes 121–47 and accompanying text.
107. For further discussion on the argument that consent-by-registration violates due process, see infra notes 121–47 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 556
(D. Del. 2014) (determining consent-by-registration does not comport with
Daimler’s requirements for jurisdiction). In AstraZeneca, the court stated specifically that, “[i]n light of the holding in Daimler . . . [the defendant’s] compliance
with Delaware’s registration statutes . . . cannot constitute consent to jurisdiction . . . .” Id. It found the resulting jurisdiction exercised through consent-byregistration was “specifically at odds with Daimler.” See id. at 557 (citing Daimler AG
v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138 (2014)) (comparing the low bar of registration to the
high bar Daimler set).
109. See AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (relying on Daimler’s prohibition of
using continuous and systematic contacts). But see Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v.
Mylan Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 588–89 (D. Del. 2015) (noting Daimler was
largely silent on consent-based jurisdiction except to differentiate it from contactsbased jurisdiction). While AstraZeneca focused on the limiting language of Daimler
regarding the prohibition on the use of continuous and systematic contacts, Acorda
Therapeutics focused instead on the distinction between consent-based and contacts-based jurisdiction. See Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 589 (noting
Daimler’s lacking discussion of consent-based jurisdiction). The Acorda Therapeutics
court states that Daimler “preserves what has long been the case: . . . that . . . jurisdiction may be established by showing that a corporation is ‘at home’ . . . or . . . ‘by
a corporation’s consent to such jurisdiction.’ ” See id. (interpreting Daimler’s silence on consent as evidence that it did not disturb the doctrine).
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ing practice of consent to jurisdiction.110 An example of this interpretation of Daimler is most notable in the cases of Acorda Therapeutics and
Bors.111 Acorda Therapeutics decided that Daimler sought to differentiate
consent-based and contacts-based jurisdiction.112
The opposing theory requires a much broader interpretation of
Daimler.113 Rather than focus on the lack of references to consent in
Daimler, some courts assert that Daimler, when viewed as an attempt to create a certain landscape of general jurisdiction, renders consent-by-registration invalid.114 In order to achieve this conclusion, courts, such as the
District of Delaware in AstraZeneca, focus on the parameters that Daimler
set for general jurisdiction via the “at home” test.115 For example, Daimler
prohibits the exercise of general jurisdiction under a contacts theory
where a corporation’s actions within the state are only “continuous and
systematic.”116 It follows that if continuous and systematic contacts are
110. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prods. Inc., No. 5:18-CV-00699,
2018 WL 3707377, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2018) (agreeing with reasoning of Acorda
Therapeutics and stating that “Daimler did not mean, ‘sub silentio, to eliminate consent as a basis for jurisdiction.’ ” (citing Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 591));
Acorda Therpeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 589 (noting that Daimler had “nothing to say”
about consent as means of establishing jurisdiction).
111. See Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2016)
(determining that the Supreme Court’s mention of consent jurisdiction in Daimler
was “to distinguish between ‘consensual’ jurisdiction and ‘non-consensual bases
for jurisdiction’ . . . .” (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 128)); Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F.
Supp. 3d at 591 (finding Daimler did not preclude consent-by-registration).
112. See Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 589 (interpreting Daimler’s single reference to consent). Beyond Daimler, Acorda Therapeutics examined the effect
of International Shoe on the distinction between consent-based and contacts-based
jurisdiction. See id. (affirming the difference between consent and contacts as
means of obtaining jurisdiction). There, too, Acorda Therapeutics found that the
language in International Shoe distinguished between consent and contacts. See id.
(“International Shoe described how a corporation may have sufficient ‘presence’ in a
forum to give rise to personal jurisdiction over it ‘even though no consent to be
sued . . . has been given.’ ” (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313
(1945))).
113. See, e.g., AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (applying the holding of
Daimler to consent-based jurisdiction). AstraZeneca rejects the argument “that
Daimler plays no role in the consent analysis because that case dealt with the minimum-contacts aspect . . . .” See id. (extending Daimler’s analysis beyond the contacts-based jurisdiction at issue in Daimler).
114. See id. at 556–57 (clarifying that consent, like contacts, must be “rooted
in due process”); see also Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 141 (Del. 2016)
(calling for narrower reading of Delaware’s registration statute so as not to run
afoul of “Daimler’s teachings”). AstraZeneca referenced the jurisdictional results
that would occur from consent-by-registration, calling them “specifically at odds
with Daimler.” See id. at 557 (applying the due process concerns from Daimler to the
facts of the case).
115. See AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (remarking on contact-based limits
that Daimler reaffirmed for exercise of general jurisdiction).
116. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137–38 (2014) (describing the
jurisdictional results of looking only to continuous and systematic contacts as
“unacceptably grasping”).
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insufficient for the exercise of general jurisdiction under the “at home”
test, then the imposition of general jurisdiction where the corporation is
“merely ‘doing business’” would also be improper.117
When district courts attempt to reconcile Daimler’s mandate against
the sole use of continuous and systematic contacts with the practice of
consent-by-registration, the courts necessarily conclude that the two conflict and cannot be simultaneously true.118 The impetus for these decisions rests on a theory that Daimler was doing more than merely stating a
rule for the minimum contacts necessary for general jurisdiction; rather,
the Court was attempting to create a larger regime or scheme of general
jurisdiction.119 Thus, the argument goes, in order for a means of obtaining jurisdiction to remain valid after Daimler, it must comport with the
larger scheme of general jurisdiction.120
B.

Does Consent-by-registration Violate Due Process?

Another argument often advanced by courts in declining to uphold
consent-by-registration is that the practice violates the due process requirements for jurisdiction.121 Famously, the Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington122 stated that the exercise of jurisdiction must not offend
117. See AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (finding registration to do business
falls within Daimler’s prohibitions). The court quoted a portion of Daimler stating,
“[s]uch a theory . . . ‘would scarcely permit out-of-state defendants to structure
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will
and will not render them liable to suit.’ ” Id. (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138–39)
(citation omitted). However, this notion must be contrasted with the theory that
voluntary consent leaves a corporation with “no uncertainty as to the jurisdictional
consequences of its actions.” See Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 591 (determining that consent provides more jurisdictional certainty than contacts-based
jurisdiction).
118. See, e.g., AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (“[T]he Supreme Court rejected the idea that a company could be haled into court merely for ‘doing business’ in a state.” (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138–39)); Genuine Parts, 137 A.3d at
143–44 (“Daimler rejected the notion that a corporation that does business in many
states can be subject to general jurisdiction in all of them.” (footnote omitted)).
119. See AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (determining that both contactsbased jurisdiction and consent-based jurisdiction were subject to due process limitations set forth in Daimler).
120. See id. (applying Daimler limitations to consent-based jurisdiction).
121. See id. (“[A]ll questions regarding personal jurisdiction[ ] are rooted in
due process.”); Monestier, supra note 10, at 1388–91 (discussing due process concerns as they pertain to the validity of consent). While cases like AstraZeneca address due process concerns with respect to the results of consent-by-registration, at
least one commentator addresses the due process concerns as they pertain specifically to the validity of consent and not to the jurisdictional results. See Monestier,
supra note 10, at 1388–89 (analyzing due process issues as they arise in the course
of determining valid consent as opposed to the resulting jurisdiction). This is because, as the scholar puts it, “consent provides the underlying basis of jurisdiction,
and no further due process analysis is necessary.” See id. at 1381 (citing Burger
King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985)) (asserting valid consent
obviates need for due process inquiry into the resulting jurisdiction).
122. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”123 The court in
AstraZeneca echoed this concern, asserting that consent to jurisdiction, like
minimum contacts, is “rooted in due process.”124 As such, the AstraZeneca
court found that consent to jurisdiction must also comport with notions of
fair play and justice.125
Notwithstanding, scholars and judges disagree over the role of due
process concerns where consent is the basis for jurisdiction.126 At least
one commentator argues that “due process is satisfied by virtue of the defendant corporation’s knowing and voluntary consent in registering to do
business and appointing an agent for service of process.”127 In such a
123. See id. at 316 (denoting the due process limits of personal jurisdiction).
This language, although used in a specific jurisdiction case, has made its way into
the calculus for general jurisdiction as well. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 126 (citing Int’l
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316) (citing language from International Shoe regarding the due
process limits of personal jurisdiction).
124. See AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (applying Daimler due process concerns to consent-based jurisdiction). Unlike the commentator who addressed due
process concerns regarding the validity of consent, AstraZeneca focuses the due process concerns on the resulting jurisdiction. See id. (analyzing due process concerns as
they pertain to resulting jurisdiction). But See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1388–89
(analyzing due process issues as they arise in the course of determining valid
consent).
125. See AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (holding consent-by-registration
jurisdiction did not comport with these due process requirements).
126. See Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648, 654 (E.D. Pa. 2016)
(finding that “Daimler ‘was limited to the conclusion that continuous and systematic contacts, by themselves, were not enough to establish general personal jurisdiction . . . .’ ” (emphasis added) (citing Pfizer Inc. v. Mylan Inc., Civ. A., No. 15-26SLR-SRF, 2016 WL 1319700, at *10 (D. Del. Apr. 4, 2016))); Monestier, supra note
10, at 1378 (noting due process analysis is not necessary where consent is basis of
jurisdiction). The conclusion that valid consent obviates a need for an analysis of
due process concerns is seemingly at odds with the court’s opinion in AstraZeneca.
See AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (applying due process concerns to use of
consent to obtain jurisdiction). The court in AstraZeneca declined to uphold the
consent-by-registration scheme because it did not meet due process requirements.
See id. (applying due process implications to the resulting jurisdiction). However,
according to one commentator, the court would have had to first determine that
the consent itself was invalid before reaching the question of due process considerations. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1378 (asserting valid consent obviates the
need for a due process inquiry into the resulting jurisdiction).
127. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1359 (“The corporation’s consent, in
itself, satisfies due process.” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 43 & cmt. b. (1971)); see also Craig Sanders, Note, Of Carrots and Sticks: General
Jurisdiction and Genuine Consent, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1323, 1333 (2017) (“It is important to note first that a party can waive Due Process Clause protection by consenting to jurisdiction.” (citing Monestier, supra note 10, at 1379)). In addition to
the concern that AstraZeneca may have preemptively introduced due process concerns into the calculus, there is also a concern that the court conflated consent
with minimum contacts. See AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (equating consentby-registration jurisdiction with type of “doing business” jurisdiction that was rejected in Daimler). The court in AstraZeneca used Daimler’s prohibition on continuous and systematic contacts to establish general jurisdiction over a defendant to
reject the notion of consent-by-registration. See id. (finding consent-by-registration
falls below even the continuous and systematic threshold). Nevertheless, as at least

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 4

124

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64: p. 101

case, a court need not inquire into due process concerns that stem from
the resulting jurisdiction.128 This theory also appears in the court’s analysis in Bors.129 The court reasoned that Daimler’s prohibition on the use of
continuous and systematic contacts extended only to situations where
those contacts are used to justify jurisdiction in the absence of consent.130
one commentator and one court note, “[c]onsent to jurisdiction is a separate and
independent basis for jurisdiction that is not subject to the minimum contacts
test.” See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1359 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472
n.14) (differentiating consent-based jurisdiction and contacts-based jurisdiction).
128. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1378 (arguing valid consent satisfies any
due process concerns regarding resulting jurisdiction). Although the commentator does not make an explicit distinction, it would seem that there are really two
due process considerations at play. See id. at 1389 (stating that no due process is
necessary, but also stating that “even if the relevant statute provided ample notice
that registration . . . would be deemed consent . . . this would still not be consistent
with due process”). Where consent is the basis of jurisdiction, it would seem that a
due process analysis of the resulting jurisdiction is not required. See id. at 1378
(stating due process is satisfied by valid consent). However, implicit in the commentator’s analysis is the theory that the validity of the consent itself must be considered with a due process lens. See id. at 1389 (arguing that lack of alternatives
presented to corporation “[i]n the context of registration statutes” leads to involuntary decision that is inconsistent with due process).
129. See Bors, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 654 (differentiating between consent and
contacts as bases for jurisdiction). The proposition in Bors, which allows for consent to stand separate and apart from a minimum contacts analysis, played out in
Allstate to allow for jurisdiction over a corporate defendant without any inquiry
into the number of relevant contacts. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home
Prods. Inc., No. 5:18-CV-00699, 2018 WL 3707377, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2018)
(finding jurisdiction properly exercised over defendant pursuant to Pennsylvania’s
registration provision). If an analysis of the contacts of the defendant was necessary, it would have required an exceptional case to establish that the corporation,
incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in North Carolina
and with only six Pennsylvania employees, would be amenable to general jurisdiction under the “at home” test. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 6–7, Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prods. Inc., No. 5:18-cv-00699, 2018 WL 3707377, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2018). Thus, courts in Pennsylvania have largely interpreted
Daimler’s prohibition on the use of “continuous and systematic” contacts to be inapplicable where the basis of jurisdiction is consent-by-registration. See Bors, 208 F.
Supp. 3d at 654–55 (limiting Daimler’s prohibition on use of continuous and systematic contacts to contacts-based jurisdiction).
130. See Bors, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 654 (distinguishing sole use of continuous
and systematic contacts from presence of consent that gives rise to jurisdiction).
The court posits that the latter scenario does not run afoul of Daimler’s prohibition
on the use of continuous and systematic contacts. See id. at 654 (differentiating
consent and contacts as bases of jurisdiction). This concern about conflation between minimum contacts and consent was specifically addressed by a district court
for the District of New Jersey. See Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, 182 F. Supp. 3d
166, 179 (D.N.J. 2016) (correcting previous decision that conflated consent and
contacts). In Display Works, the court addressed a pre-Daimler decision in the District of New Jersey in which the court announced that “ ‘[f]iling a certificate to do
business in New Jersey [is] insufficient to establish general jurisdiction, absent evidence that [defendant] was actually doing business.’ ” See id. (citing Kubin v. Orange Lake Country Club, Inc., CIV.A. No. 10-1643 (FLW), 2010 WL 3981908, at *3
(D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2010)) (emphasis added) (describing reasoning of previous case to
be corrected). Display Works disagreed with the requirement that there need be
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Considering the theory that a due process discussion is unnecessary
where the basis of jurisdiction is consent, the threshold issue of whether
the consent itself is valid remains.131 As Gorton stated, “a corporation may
freely agree to be subject to personal jurisdiction in other states – so long
as that consent is knowing and voluntary . . . .”132 Nevertheless, commentators argue that even in the face of an explicit statute, consent-by-registration lacks voluntariness.133 For these commentators, the take-it-or-leave-it
decision that corporations are forced to make acts as a coercive force that
thwarts the notion of voluntary consent.134
Nevertheless, the choice between doing business and registering, not
doing business at all, or doing business without registering and subjecting
the company to the relevant fines is a choice, as another commentator
argues.135 Further, very few states interpret their registration statutes to
evidence of actual business conducted. See id. (noting a conflation of contacts and
consent). The court recounted the Third Circuit’s decision in Bane, which relied
solely on the registration of the corporation and did not consider its contacts with
the state. See id. (citing Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991))
(pointing to Bane’s sole reliance on consent). In declining to conflate minimum
contacts and consent, the court stated “[t]he proposition that consent depends on
business contacts therefore cannot be attributed to Bane or its progeny.” Id. (footnote omitted) (distinguishing clearly between contacts and consent bases for
jurisdiction).
131. See Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 1961 802 EDA 2018, 2018 WL
3025283, at *6 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. May 30, 2018) (analyzing the validity of registration as a form of consent); Monestier, supra note 10, at 1379 (asserting validity of
registration as a form of consent must be analyzed). Both the Mallory case and the
commentator looked at whether the consent itself was validly given. See, e.g.,
Monestier, supra note 10, at 1379–80 (noting courts often miss this step in the
analysis). As one commentator characterizes the issue, “[c]alling registration consent does not actually make it consent.” See id. at 1379 (reinforcing need for analysis
of registration as a form of consent).
132. See Gorton v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 3d 278, 295 (M.D. Pa.
2018) (emphasis in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (stating the requirements for valid consent). Gorton heavily addresses the issue of
“knowing” consent, and implies that the consent had been legitimately voluntary.
See id. at 297 (relying on Pennsylvania’s explicit statute in finding consent was
knowingly given via registration).
133. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1389–90 (arguing businesses do not have
a voluntary choice to register); see also Sanders, supra note 127, at 111 (agreeing
that act of registration is involuntary given lack of options).
134. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1389–90 (asserting registration is not a
choice). One commentator focused specifically on the lack of alternatives in deciding that the consent was involuntary. See id. (noting, in a globalized economy,
nonregistration is hardly an option). The commentator suggests that a corporation that wishes to do business in a state only has three options: (1) register and
thereby consent to jurisdiction, (2) refrain from doing business in the state, or (3)
do business without registering and face the penalties associated with such action.
See id. at 1390 (explaining the list of alternatives available to a business).
135. See Chase, supra note 93, at, 180–81 (stating choice between doing business and registering, doing business and not registering, and refraining from doing business is still choice nonetheless).
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confer general jurisdiction over registrants.136 Although the choice of
whether to do business in the state may prove difficult for a national corporation with a large presence, a choice exists nonetheless.137
Beyond the requirement of voluntariness, consent must also be knowing.138 Gorton remarked on this explicitly, stating it is uncertain whether a
statute that lacked the same statutory language as Pennsylvania’s would be
able to claim that it provides adequate notice.139 Notwithstanding, the
court in Acorda Therapeutics determined that where a registration statute
“has long and unambiguously been interpreted as constituting consent to
general jurisdiction,” the registrant business “[has] no uncertainty as to
the jurisdictional consequences of its actions.”140 At least one commentator argues that Pennsylvania Fire eliminated the need for actual notice for
consent.141 In support, the commentator points to the onus that Pennsylvania Fire placed on the defendant corporation in anticipating where it
may be sued as a result of its choice to register.142 Taking the opposite
136. See id. at 181 (noting low adoption of consent-by-registration statutes).
This idea shows that a corporation is not, as one commentator suggested, precluded from doing business in the United States at all if they wish to remain free
from general jurisdiction. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1390 (positing widespread preclusion from business if corporations wanted to avoid jurisdiction).
137. See Chase, supra note 93, at 181 (arguing that businesses do have a choice
to register). The argument that a choice exists is the opposite of that made by the
court in Mallory. See Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 1961 802 EDA 2018, 2018
WL 3025283, at *7 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. May 30, 2018) (determining no choice existed
for corporations when it came to registration). Even though Mallory noted the
choice that businesses have, the court still determined that the requirement of
registration as a pre-requisite to doing business in the state made it an involuntary
action. See id. (describing alternatives, but finding nonetheless that registration is
involuntary).
138. See Gorton v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 3d 278, 295 (M.D. Pa.
2018) (defining valid consent as knowing and voluntary).
139. See id. at 297 (relying on the explicit notice provided by Pennsylvania’s
statute). The court repeated multiple times that, in the absence of explicit language, “qualifying as a foreign corporation in a state is not a sufficient basis upon
which to conclude that a corporation is ‘at home’ in the state.” Id. at 298. This
implies the importance of notice to the validity of the consent. See id. at 297–98
(noting a nonexplicit statute would likely fail to confer valid jurisdiction).
140. See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572,
591 (D. Del. 2015) (finding consent-based jurisdiction provides some certainty as
to possible forums for suit). For concerns that arise from conflating this type of
notice with actual notice, see infra notes 177–85.
141. See Chase, supra note 93, at 198 (recounting Pennsylvania Fire allowed for
exercise of jurisdiction where there was no explicit statutory notice to that effect
(citing Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243
U.S. 93, 95–96 (1917))).
142. See id. (citing Pennsylvania Fire, 243 U.S. at 96) (stating onus is on defendant in “anticipating the effects of its registration . . .”). As the court in Pennsylvania Fire stated, the insurer had appointed “an agent in language that rationally
might be held to go to that length.” See Pennsylvania Fire, 243 U.S. at 95 (reinforcing duty of defendant to understand consequences of registration statute language). As argued later in this Comment, this notion that jurisdiction may take a
defendant “by surprise” does not comport with the Supreme Court’s later jurispru-
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position, another commentator submits that even if each jurisdiction provided explicit statutory notice to each registrant, the exercise of jurisdiction is inconsistent with due process.143
Despite the argument that due process concerns need not be evaluated where valid consent is found, there are commentators and courts that
analyzed notice as a due process issue and invalidated consent-by-registration on those grounds.144 For example, the court in Display Works, LLC v.
Bartley145 explicitly held that a consent-by-registration scheme may be held
invalid on the basis of lacking notice.146 Further, at least one commentator refers to the issue of notice as a “due process concern” rather than as a
part of the consent analysis.147
IV. “I’LL GET YOU MY PRETTIES”: HOW A CONSENT-BY-REGISTRATION
SCHEME CAN SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISH JURISDICTION
OVER REGISTRANTS
This Comment argues that Daimler does not preclude consent-by-registration.148 It further argues, consent-by-registration constitutes volundence on jurisdiction. Compare id. (stating that it would make no difference even if
jurisdiction “took the defendant by surprise”), with Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (“[T]he Due Process Clause ‘gives a degree of
predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and
will not render them liable to suit . . . .’ ” (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980))).
143. See Chase, supra note 93, at 198 (discussing the due process consideration as it pertains to the voluntariness of the consent). For a discussion of the
distinction between due process considerations that focus on the resulting jurisdiction and those that focus on the component pieces of valid consent, see supra note
128 and accompanying text.
144. See Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, 182 F. Supp. 3d 166, 179 (D.N.J. 2016)
(“The [c]ourt holds that New Jersey’s registration and service statutes do not constitute consent to general jurisdiction because they do not contain express reference to any such terms.”); Chase, supra note 93, at 197 (“Another due process
concern raised by commentators and courts is that corporations lack adequate notice that registration will subject them to general jurisdiction.”).
145. 182 F. Supp. 3d 166 (D.N.J. 2016).
146. See Display Works, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 179 (addressing lack of express reference to jurisdiction in statute as “because” reason for lack of consent-by-registration in the case ).
147. See Chase, supra note 93, at 197 (describing notice as another due process concern to be considered). It is unclear here whether this commentator, like
others, is using the phrase “due process concern” to address the concerns related
to the resulting jurisdiction or to the component parts of adequate consent. See id.
(failing to distinguish between the different applications of due process concerns).
At least one case that the commentator cites to addressed the issue of notice as an
independent concept, separate of the requirements for consent. See id. (citing
Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 637 (2d Cir. 2016)) (addressing
notice as a due process concern outside of the requirements for valid consent).
148. For a discussion of why Daimler does not preclude consent-by-registration, see infra notes 151–55 and accompanying text.
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tary consent.149 The issue that differentiates certain schemes from others
is the issue of notice, and therefore, only those exercises of consent-byregistration that provide actual notice represent valid consent.150
As a threshold matter, Daimler does not preclude general jurisdiction
through consent.151 At least one court recognized large-scale changes,
left undiscussed by Daimler, that would result from reading Daimler as eliminating consent.152 Therefore, the analysis assumes that consent remains
a valid basis of obtaining jurisdiction after Daimler.153 In keeping with the
black letter law of consent-based jurisdiction, the presence of valid consent
obviates the need for due process considerations to enter the calculus.154
Thus, it must first be determined if registration is a valid form of
consent.155
A.

Consent-by-registration Meets the Voluntariness Requirement
for Valid Consent

Although commentators make spirited arguments against the voluntariness of consent-by-registration, evidence supports the conclusion that the
149. For a discussion of why consent-by-registration is voluntary consent, see
infra notes 156–71 and accompanying text.
150. For a discussion of why consent-by-registration should require actual notice, see infra notes 172–85 and accompanying text.
151. See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572,
589 (D. Del. 2015) (determining that Daimler has not precluded the practice of
consent-by-registration); see also Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648,
653 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (finding Daimler did not eliminate consent-based jurisdiction).
For a discussion of the rationales of these courts with respect to Daimler preclusion,
see supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
152. See Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 591 (“[T]he undersigned
[j]udge does not believe that Daimler meant, sub silentio, to eliminate consent as a
basis for jurisdiction.”). The court makes an interesting point regarding a rarelydiscussed effect of reading Daimler to eliminate consent as a basis for jurisdiction.
See id. (analyzing Daimler’s effect on consent as a basis of jurisdiction). It posits
that, if Daimler did eliminate consent, the personal jurisdiction defense would be
altered “from a waivable to a non-waivable right, a characteristic of the defense
that was not before the Daimler Court and is not explicitly addressed in its opinion.” See id. (describing a major impact to personal jurisdiction that would result
from reading Daimler as having eliminated consent-based jurisdiction).
153. For a more thorough discussion of the arguments related to Daimler and
consent, see supra notes 108–17 and accompanying text.
154. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compganie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 703–04 (1982) (stating consent obviates a need for due process considerations involving the resulting jurisdiction). Despite the urge of some courts to
address due process concerns related to the resulting jurisdiction prior to addressing the validity of consent, the law is well settled that valid consent eliminates the
need for a due process discussion regarding the resulting jurisdiction. See id.
(describing the effect of consent on due process concerns).
155. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1378–80 (asserting validity of the consent
must be addressed prior to any analysis of due process concerns that result from
the actual exercise of general jurisdiction).
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options for corporations may not be as limited as they seem.156 First, because businesses have the decision of registering to do business, not doing
business in the state, or doing business in the state sans registration and
subjecting themselves to the applicable fines, they have a voluntary choice
before them.157 These options are, in fact, “alternatives,” which are required for consent to be voluntary.158 In addition, case law provides businesses with other alternatives to registering to do business in the state.159
For example, in Pennsylvania, whether or not a corporation is deemed to
be “doing business” is a question of fact to be determined by the fact
finder.160 Therefore, a corporation may conduct business-related activi-

156. See id. at 1379 (“Calling registration consent does not actually make it consent.”); see also Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 1961 802 EDA 2018, 2018 WL
3025283, at *6 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. May 30, 2018) (“A review of Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme belies [p]laintiff’s argument because [d]efendant’s consent to jurisdiction was not voluntary.”). The commentator makes two distinct arguments
against the voluntariness of the registration. See Monestier, supra note 10, at
1389–90 (arguing registration is involuntary). The first involves a lack of alternatives that a corporation may choose if they are seeking to avoid amenability to suit.
See id. at 1389 (asserting lack of choice as an argument against voluntariness). The
second argument is the presence of registration statutes in all fifty states. See id. at
1390 (asserting widespread use of registration statutes as argument against voluntariness). According to the commentator, the fact that each state may exercise jurisdiction on the basis of registration further supports a lack of voluntary choice in
the matter. See id. (concluding registration is involuntary). However, as this Comment argues, such a result can be remedied by adjustments to the notice requirement and will be accounted for by incentives that guard against mass adoption of
consent-by-registration. For a discussion of the concerns surrounding mass adoption, see infra notes 162–71 and accompanying text.
157. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1389 (noting alternatives do exist but
finding them insufficiently voluntary). But see Chase, supra note 93, at 180 (noting,
after all, choices of doing business with registration, doing business without registration, or not doing business at all are still choices).
158. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1389 (requiring alternatives be present
for consent to be voluntary). As another commentator has noted, there are alternatives in this decision. See Chase, supra note 93, at 180 (listing the alternatives
available for corporations).
159. See Wenzel v. Morris Distrib. Co., 266 A.2d 662, 666-67 (Pa. 1970) (analyzing whether corporation was “doing business” in the state).
160. See id. at 666–67 (acknowledging that doing business is question of fact
for a fact-finder); see also Univ. of Dominica v. Pa. Coll. of Podiatric Med., 446 A.2d
1339, 1341 (1982) (acknowledging that doing business is question of fact for a
fact-finder). Both of these cases remark that whether a corporation is doing business is a “question of fact.” See Wenzel, 266 A.2d at 666 (“Whether a corporation is
‘doing business’ . . . is a matter of fact to be resolved on an Ad hoc or case-by-case
basis.”); see also Univ. of Dominica, 466 A.2d 1339 (stating same test for whether
corporation is doing business). In a counterfactual analyzed by the court, a corporation was able to avoid having to register to do business in the state by dealing
through independent contractors. See Wenzel, 266 A.2d at 666–67 (noting corporations may conduct certain activities without necessarily doing business); see also 15
PA. CONS. AND STAT. ANN. § 403(a)(5) (West 2018) (enumerating different activities a corporation may take engage in that do not constitute doing business).
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ties in the state without the requisite registration, representing yet another
alternative.161
Furthermore, it is important to address the concern of mass adoption
of consent-by-registration that scholars use to bolster arguments that consent-by-registration is involuntary.162 It is not the case that, because all
fifty states maintain consent-by-registration statutes, a corporation can only
really choose to not do business “at all in the United States.”163 Despite
the contention, only a handful of states have interpreted their registration
statutes to confer consent over the registrant.164 This fact, gleaned over
100 years since Pennsylvania Fire’s glowing endorsement of consent to jurisdiction, cuts harshly against arguments of widespread adoption.165
While Genuine Parts signaled that a corporate-leading state such as
Delaware might have a tide-changing impact on the landscape of consentby-registration in the nation, the court remarked on facts that cut against
widespread adoption of the practice.166 This argument often begins with
the premise that Daimler sought to limit the scope of general jurisdiction
by stating that “continuous and systematic” contacts were not sufficient for
general jurisdiction.167 It then posits that widespread use of consent-byregistration would lead “to an ‘unacceptably grasping’ and ‘exorbitant’ ex161. See Wenzel, 266 A.2d at 666 (noting alternatives exist to the binary “doing
business” or not doing business choice).
162. See Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 142–43 (Del. 2016) (expressing concern that if Delaware were to act in favor of consent-by-registration
that other jurisdictions would soon follow); Monestier, supra note 10, at 1390
(“Since all fifty states have the same laws requiring registration, this ‘option’ really
amounts to a corporation simply not doing business at all in the United States.”).
163. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1390 (arguing widespread presence of
registration statutes hampers business’ alternatives). The commentator addresses
the counter-argument that very few of the fifty states have interpreted their registration statutes to confer general jurisdiction over the corporate defendant. See id.
(noting small number of states that use registration to confer jurisdiction). Nonetheless, the commentator asserts that this is no consolation, as “all fifty states could
constitutionally exercise it.” See id. (emphasis added) (asserting possibility of widespread registration jurisdiction is sufficient to warrant its involuntariness).
164. See Benish, supra note 102, at 1647 (noting only a handful of states have
interpreted their registration statutes to confer jurisdiction).
165. See id. (noting low adoption rates of registration jurisdiction long after
passing of case that allowed for it). For a discussion of Pennsylvania Fire and its
endorsement of consent-based jurisdiction, see supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
166. See Genuine Parts, 137 A.3d at 142–43 (expressing concern that Delaware’s action may lead to widespread action in favor of consent-by-registration).
167. See id. at 136 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138–39
(2014)) (noting the limiting language from Daimler). But see Bors v. Johnson &
Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (finding that Daimler’s prohibition on sole use of continuous and systematic contacts was limited to just that and
“offered no guidance on acceptable criteria for jurisdiction by consent”) (citing
Pfizer Inc. v. Mylan Inc., No. 15–26-SLR-SRF, 2016 WL 1319700, at *10 (D. Del.
Apr. 4, 2016))).
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ercise of jurisdiction, [in]consistent with Daimler’s teachings.”168 Furthermore, the Delaware Supreme Court expressed concern that interpreting
its statute to confer general jurisdiction essentially increases the cost of
doing business in the state, such that a corporation may choose to do business elsewhere.169 If this proposition is accepted as true, states that seek
to maintain their business-friendly status will decline to interpret their statutes as requiring consent in an effort to retain business in that state, which
effectively cuts against the notion of widespread use of the practice.170
Given the alternatives available to corporations and the incentives that
guard against broad-spectrum acceptance of consent-by-registration, consent-by-registration amounts to voluntary consent.171
B.

Valid Consent-by-registration Should Require Actual Statutory Notice

In addition to being voluntary, consent must also be given knowingly.172 Foremost, the notice inquiry should not be conflated with the
voluntariness inquiry.173 It is not the case that absolutely no notice is re168. See Genuine Parts, 137 A.3d at 141 (discussing why registration jurisdiction
is inconsistent with Daimler). The court in Genuine Parts noted that Delaware plays
host to “a majority of the United States’ largest corporations . . . .” Id. at 143.
There is a concern that “[s]uch an exercise of overreaching by Delaware will also
encourage other states to do the same.” Id. at 142–43. The court fears that
“ ‘grasping’ behavior by one, can lead to grasping behavior by everyone, to the
collective detriment of the common good.” Id. at 143. Despite these concerns,
history shows that the continued validity of consent-by-registration has not led to
the sort of grasping or sprawling view of jurisdiction that some cases predicted. See
Benish, supra note 102, at 1647 (noting low adoption rates of registration jurisdiction). For a discussion on the current use of consent statutes nationwide, see supra
notes 97–104 and accompanying text.
169. See Genuine Parts, 137 A.3d at 142 (discussing economic rationales for
declining to adopt registration jurisdiction). This concern over raising the cost of
doing business cuts against the concern that states will, by and large, interpret
their registration statutes to confer general jurisdiction. See id. at 142–43 (“Such
an exercise of overreaching by . . . Delaware may encourage other states to do the
same.”). Beyond offering a counter-argument against widespread adoption, this
reality also affirms the fact that there is indeed a choice that businesses can exercise when it comes to where they register to do business. See id. (stating business
may choose to do business elsewhere if registration constitutes jurisdiction).
170. See id. at 142 (discussing cost of doing business as driver for corporate
action).
171. See Wenzel v. Morris Distrib. Co., 266 A.2d 662, 666–67 (Pa. 1970) (discussing how corporation may engage in certain corporate activities without triggering need to register to do business); see also Genuine Parts, 137 A.3d at 142
(discussing incentives that point away from mass adoption including raising of cost
of doing business that would result from upholding consent-by-registration);
Chase, supra note 93, at 180 (discussing alternatives that exists for corporations
when faced with decision of where to do business).
172. See Gorton v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 3d 278, 295 (M.D. Pa.
2018) (noting that valid consent is both voluntary and knowingly given).
173. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1389 (rejecting consent-by-registration
nearly entirely on voluntariness grounds). After asserting that no amount of notice can salvage the practice of consent-by-registration, the commentator relies on
an argument of involuntariness to support the assertion. See id. at 1389–90 (declin-
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quired for consent in this manner to be given knowingly.174 Rather, actual statutory notice should be required for consent-by-registration to be
deemed knowing consent consistent with general jurisdiction
requirements.175
The scholarly body that argues for consent-by-registration’s validity
without statutory notice finds backing in district court opinions.176
Namely, in Acorda Therapeutics, the court determined that the statute’s interpretation satisfies knowing consent, given that the interpretation was
longstanding and unambiguous.177 There is one major issue with considering judicial interpretation of a statute to satisfy the notice necessary to
validate consent: the preservation of defendants’ ability to structure their
conduct to avoid suit.178
From early on in the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, there is a well-recognized concern about the ability of defendants
to structure their conduct such that they may know where they are and are
not amenable to suit.179 Even the court in Acorda Therapeutics noted the
importance that a registrant “have no uncertainty as to the jurisdictional
ing to discuss notice in depth after determining involuntariness). As such, the
critique that no amount of notice can salvage the scheme fails to address the notice issue outside of the confines of the voluntariness issue. See id. at 1389 (passing
on issue of notice insofar as involuntariness decides the question).
174. See Chase, supra note 93, at 197–98 (asserting Pennsylvania Fire abdicates
the need for actual notice of consent within a registration statute (citing Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95
(1917))).
175. For arguments regarding the proper notice required, see infra notes
176–85 and accompanying text.
176. Compare Chase, supra note 93, at 198 (requiring no statutory notice for
valid consent-by-registration scheme), with Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan
Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 591 (D. Del. 2015) (finding that registration
statute, absent explicit notice, can still confer general jurisdiction where it has
been “long and unambiguously” interpreted to do so).
177. See Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 591 (determining judicial interpretation of statute can qualify as notice). Although it used the terminology “long
and unambiguously,” the court did not set any temporal limits as to how long the
statute must have been interpreted in that manner, nor how courts should attempt
to square the initial interpretive case with the import that the interpretation be
longstanding. See id. (failing to explain how to apply interpretation test to future
cases).
178. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (citing
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)) (“[T]he
Due Process Clause ‘gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit . . . .’ ”).
179. See Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 97–98 (1978) (“[W]e
therefore see no basis on which it can be said that appellant could reasonably have
anticipated being ‘haled before a [California] court’ . . . .” (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977))); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (noting importance of
corporation’s ability to structure conduct to avoid suit).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss1/4

32

Broczowski: Apparently, There Are Places Like Home: A Path to Propriety for C

2019]

COMMENT

133

consequences of its actions.”180 While this may be true in Delaware where
the interpretation dates back to 1988, the same cannot be true for the
practice of consent-by-registration as a whole.181 For example, consider a
state that has not yet interpreted its registration statute to confer consent;
there is no longstanding judicial interpretation to rely on, nor is there any
explicit statutory language that confers jurisdiction beyond the standard
appointment of an agent for service of process.182 If the status of a state’s
registration statute can be amended through judicial interpretation, corporations lose the ability to structure their conduct, becoming beholden
to the new interpretation in an instant.183
180. See Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 591 (noting consent provides
certainty as to jurisdiction). While this may be true in Pennsylvania, there is an
argument to be made that this is not true in Delaware or New Jersey, as their
statutory provisions do not provide any explicit notice of the consequences of registration. See id. (discussing certainty but providing little guidance regarding what
constitutes certainty in registration as consent); Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan, Inc.,
106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 470 (D.N.J. 2015) (interpreting statute, for first time, to confer jurisdiction). Furthermore, Acorda Therapeutics used this point as a counterargument against the notion that consent-by-registration did not afford defendants
the opportunity to structure their conduct. See Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d
at 591 (stating consent-by-registration provides more jurisdictional certainty than a
contacts-based inquiry).
181. See Benish, supra note 102, at 1647 (noting majority of states have not
interpreted their statutes in one direction (jurisdiction conferring) or the other
(benign)). Requiring only judicial interpretation in lieu of explicit statutory provisions in these states would lead to jurisdiction where there is no longstanding interpretation of the statute to mean such. See, e.g., Otsuka, 106 F. Supp. 3d at 470
(deciding, in 2015, that New Jersey’s registration statute should be interpreted to
establish general jurisdiction over registrants).
182. See Benish, supra note 102, at 1647 (noting large number of statutes without interpretation). While this presents a problem for those states in which the
registration statute has not been interpreted either way, the problem is also a reality for those states like Delaware where the interpretation is inconsistent among
courts. See Acorda Therapeutics, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 591 (interpreting Delaware’s registration statute to confer general jurisdiction over registrants). But see AstraZeneca
AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 556–57 (D. Del. 2014) (interpreting
same statute as lacking power to confer jurisdiction); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec,
137 A.3d 123, 148 (Del. 2016) (interpreting same statute as lacking power to confer jurisdiction). Where the interpretation is under debate, corporations continue
to be deprived of the ability to effectively structure their conduct to avoid suit. See
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (describing the importance of a corporation’s ability to
structure its conduct).
183. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (stating importance of defendant’s ability
to structure its conduct to avoid suit). One commentator has argued that Pennsylvania Fire forecloses any argument that actual notice is required. See Chase,
supra note 93, at 198 (arguing no notice is required for consent jurisdiction).
Nonetheless, Pennsylvania Fire must be interpreted in light of those cases that have
followed it. See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (discussing the importance of a
corporation’s ability to structure its conduct with respect to jurisdiction). Since
the decision in Pennsylvania Fire, the Supreme Court, in some of the most important jurisdiction cases to date, has shown a strong preference for the preservation
of the ability of corporate defendants to structure their conduct such that they may
be able to reasonably anticipate where they can be hauled into court. See, e.g., id.
(illustrating need for jurisdictional predictability).
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Where the legislative process is the vehicle for changing the registration statute through the addition of explicit jurisdiction-conferring language, both the length and deliberate nature of the process afford
corporations time to situate their affairs in order to avoid jurisdiction in
that forum.184 Therefore, in order for a consent-by-registration scheme to
meet the requirements for valid consent, the registration statute or other
jurisdiction-conferring statute of the state must provide, in explicit terms,
that registration as a corporation under the laws of the state amounts to
consent to general jurisdiction in that forum.185
V.

THE MAN BEHIND

CURTAIN: THE IMPACT OF CONSENT-BYWITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT

THE

REGISTRATION

On its face, the argument that consent-by-registration requires actual
notice would leave one scheme intact and would require legislative action
to remedy the other two.186 Pennsylvania’s scheme meets the two requirements; it is volitional and provides actual notice.187 Therefore, the Third
Circuit should find that Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration scheme is
valid.188
However, the practice of consent-by-registration in both New Jersey
and Delaware is does not meet the standards I argue are required for valid184. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. AND STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 2018) (representing
an explicit jurisdiction-conferring registration statute passed through the democratic process). But see Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 470
(D.N.J. 2015) (representing a nonexplicit registration statute that was judicially
interpreted to confer jurisdiction.). Otsuka is evidence that a statute’s interpretation can change overnight, which scarcely affords corporations an opportunity to
structure their conduct so as to avoid suit. See id. (interpreting a statute without
jurisdictional consequences as now having jurisdictional consequences).
185. See, e.g., § 5301 (providing, in jurisdictional terms, the consequences of
registering to do business in Pennsylvania).
186. Compare id. (explicitly stating registration confers jurisdiction), with DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 8 § 376(a) (West 2018) (lacking any jurisdictional language), and
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:4-1 (West 2018) (lacking any jurisdictional language). The
registration statutes nor long arm statutes of neither Delaware nor New Jersey contain explicit language that would put a corporation on notice that its registration
amounts to consent to general jurisdiction. See § 376(a) (lacking language that
may be read to confer jurisdiction via consent); § 14A:4-1 (lacking similar language). Pennsylvania, on the other hand, does explicitly state in its long-arm statute that such registration amounts to conferral of general jurisdiction. See § 5301
(stating registration constitutes consent to suit and therefore jurisdiction).
187. See § 5301 (stating explicitly the consequences of registration). For a discussion of the voluntariness of consent-by-registration, see supra notes 156–71 and
accompanying text.
188. See Gorton v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 3d 278, 295 (M.D. Pa.
2018) (requiring that consent be given knowingly and voluntarily); see also Monestier, supra note 10, at 1379 (citing Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compganie des Bauxites
de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703–04 (1982)) (stating due process concerns need not
be addressed where basis of jurisdiction is valid consent).
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ity.189 While both schemes are arguably voluntary like Pennsylvania’s, the
lynchpin is notice.190 New Jersey presents an easy case, as its registration
statute did not gain the interpretation of conferring general jurisdiction
until 2015.191 This overnight shift, from a statute that does not confer
jurisdiction to one that does, deprives defendants of the ability to structure their conduct such that they may avoid suit in the forum.192 Practically, a business that was previously safe from a forum’s jurisdiction would
open its doors on Monday to find it can suddenly be hauled into court in a
jurisdiction in which it sought to avoid suit.193
Although Delaware’s statute enjoys a longer history of interpretation
stemming from 1988, that fact provides little solace.194 As the state of the
case law in Delaware shows, the interpretation of its registration statute
remains unsettled.195 The Supreme Court of Delaware remains in disagreement with some District Courts for the District of Delaware.196 The
ever-changing interpretation of the statute can be remedied by simply requiring that any consent-by-registration scheme provide explicit statutory
189. For a discussion of why actual notice should be required, see supra notes
175–85 and accompanying text.
190. For a discussion of why actual notice should be required, see supra notes
175–85 and accompanying text.
191. See Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 470 (D.N.J.
2015) (interpreting New Jersey’s statute as conferring jurisdiction in 2015). Although Acorda Therapeutics seemed to require a “longstanding” interpretation of a
registration statute to confer general jurisdiction, the court in Otsuka did not consider such a requirement when it decided that New Jersey’s statute could be read
to confer general jurisdiction over registrants in 2015. Compare id. (being first case
to determine interpretation of registration statute for state), with Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 587 (D. Del. 2015) (using
1988 Supreme Court of Delaware case as basis for longstanding interpretation).
192. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (noting
importance of jurisdictional predictability). For a discussion on the importance of
the defendant’s ability to structure their conduct to avoid suit, see supra notes
179–85.
193. See, e.g., Otsuka Pharm. Co., 106 F. Supp. 3d at 470 (changing the interpretation of New Jersey’s registration statute long after its enactment).
194. See Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1116 (Del. 1988) (interpreting
Delaware’s registration statute to confer general jurisdiction over registrants).
195. Compare Acorda Therapeutics, 72 F. Supp. 3d 591 (noting Delaware’s registration statute establishes general jurisdiction), with Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec,
137 A.3d 123, 147 (Del. 2016) (holding opposite of Acorda Therapeutics), and AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 557 (D. Del. 2014) (holding opposite of Acorda Therapeutics). From 2014 through 2016, the interpretation
of Delaware’s registration statutes has changed three times. See supra notes 44–48,
72–76, and 85–89 (describing the alternating interpretations of Delaware’s statute). The changing interpretation leaves corporations without the opportunity to
effectively structure their conduct to avoid jurisdiction where they so choose. See
supra note 179 (describing the importance of a corporation’s ability to structure
their activities to avoid suit).
196. See Acorda Therapeutics, 72 F. Supp. 3d 591 (interpreting Delaware’s registration statute in 2014 to establish general jurisdiction over registrants). But see
Genuine Parts, 137 A.3d at 147 (interpreting Delaware’s registration statute, after
Acorda Therapeutics, as not establishing general jurisdiction over registrants).
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notice of the effects of registration.197 Therefore, the Third Circuit
should find that registration under both Delaware’s and New Jersey’s statutes do not amount to valid consent because the provisions lack actual
notice.198
As mentioned earlier, where consent is invalid, one cannot avoid addressing due process concerns.199 If the “consent” offered through the
registration process is invalid on the basis of it being made unknowingly,
the only other way to characterize registration-based jurisdiction is to posit
that general jurisdiction is being exercised over the defendant corporations solely by virtue of their having registered to do business in the
state.200 Registering to do business falls far below the “at home” requirement set forth in Daimler and even falls far short of Daimler’s prohibition
on the sole use of “continuous and systematic” contacts.201 Therefore,
having determined that the schemes in New Jersey and Delaware do not
amount to valid consent, the two schemes subsequently fail to meet the
one of the basic due process requirements necessary for the exercise of
contacts-based general jurisdiction.202 As such, the exercise of general jurisdiction in New Jersey and Delaware under the consent-by-registration
theory does not meet the requirements of valid consent-based jurisdiction.203 In the spirit of offering solutions that engage the democratic process, both New Jersey and Delaware could remedy the deficiencies in their
respective consent-by-registration schemes by amending their business registration statutes or long arm statutes to explicitly state that registration
confers jurisdiction over registrants.204
197. See, e.g., Gorton v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 3d 278, 297
(M.D. Pa. 2018) (eliding importance of Pennsylvania’s explicit statute in validly
conferring general jurisdiction over registrants).
198. For a discussion on the voluntariness of consent-by-registration and why
actual notice should be required, see supra notes 156–85 and accompanying text.
199. See Monestier, supra note 10, at 1378 (stating that where there is valid
consent is basis for jurisdiction, no due process analysis is required).
200. See, e.g., AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (suggesting a contacts-based
view of registration jurisdiction). In not addressing the validity of consent, AstraZeneca looked at the practice from the standpoint that it was allowing the exercise of general jurisdiction where all that existed was a registration to do business.
See id. (applying Daimler’s prohibition on use of continuous and systematic contacts
to registration jurisdiction).
201. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137–38 (2014) (prohibiting
exercise of contacts-based general jurisdiction on nothing more than continuous
and systematic contacts). If Daimler prohibited the use of continuous and systematic contacts alone as a basis for general jurisdiction, it reasonably follows that
registration to do business would not be a permissible basis for contacts-based jurisdiction under Daimler. See id. (requiring a corporation to be “at home” in the
forum state).
202. For a discussion of the requirements for valid consent-by-registration jurisdiction, see supra notes 156–85 and accompanying text.
203. For a discussion of the requirements for valid consent-by-registration jurisdiction, see supra notes 156–85 and accompanying text.
204. For a discussion of why actual notice is necessary, see supra notes
172–185 and accompanying text.
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